Patton v. Target Corp.
242 P.3d 611
Or.2010Background
- Patton sued Target in federal court for wrongful discharge; jury awarded Patton federal damages and punitive damages under Oregon law.
- Oregon split-recovery statute ORS 31.735 allocates 60% of punitive damages to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account and 40% to the prevailing party, with notices and sequencing requirements.
- After verdict, Patton and Target settled the case without payment for punitive damages; state intervened arguing it held a 60% interest under ORS 31.735(1).
- District court held the state had no vested property right in punitive damages until final judgment, so consent to settlement was not required.
- Ninth Circuit certified the question to Oregon Supreme Court on whether the state’s consent is needed to enter a judgment effectuating a settlement that reduces the punitive damages the state would receive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ORS 31.735 require the state’s consent to post-verdict settlements reducing punitive damages? | Patton argues the state is a prejudgment judgment creditor with a protected 60% share. | Target and Patton contend no pre-judgment consent right exists; statute requires consent only for post-judgment payment applications. | No; statute does not require state consent to settlements reducing punitive damages. |
| Does legislative history show an intent to give the state blocking authority over settlements? | State cites committee statements showing concern about settlements defeating the state's share. | Text and structure of ORS 31.735 do not clearly express such consent or blocking power. | Legislative history does not translate into operational rights; not enough to read consent into the statute. |
| Is the term 'judgment creditor' properly construed as a prejudgment right under ORS 31.735? | State asserts a protected interest exists at verdict stage. | Common meaning ties 'judgment creditor' to post-judgment enforcement; no explicit pre-judgment right. | The statute does not express a prejudgment consent requirement; the term is not read to confer such rights before judgment. |
| Are subsections (4) and (5) of ORS 31.735 relevant to consent to settlements? | Consent for payment allocations after judgment could imply broader consent requirements. | These subsections show consent is required for specific post-judgment actions, not for settlements altering punitive damages before final judgment. | Subsections (4) and (5) do not render consent to settlements a prerequisite. |
Key Cases Cited
- DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or. 425, 51 P.3d 1232 (2002) (vested rights in punitive awards cannot accrue before final judgment)
- Monaco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 275 Or. 183, 550 P.2d 422 (1976) (definition of 'judgment creditor' and related concepts)
- MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 218 Or. App. 117, 179 P.3d 675 (2008) (legislative history interpretation and limits of statutory intent)
- Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 274 Or. 649, 549 P.2d 510 (1976) (legislative history and interpretive aids in statutes)
- Eulrich v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 103 Or. App. 610, 798 P.2d 715 (1990) (early interpretation of punitive damages recovery timing)
- Guzek v. State, 322 Or. 245, 906 P.2d 272 (1995) (legislative interpretation and context)