Patton v. Adesa Texas, Inc.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170722
N.D. Tex.2013Background
- Plaintiff Christina Patton, a former ADESA employee, sued ADESA under the TCHRA and sued coworkers Anesia Long and Lucianna Aycock for slander, defamation, tortious interference, and conspiracy, alleging they falsely accused her of racist remarks to cause her termination.
- ADESA removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, arguing Long and Aycock were improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction.
- Patton moved to remand, arguing joinder of the in-state coworkers was proper and diversity was lacking.
- The court applies the heavy burden for proving improper joinder, construing pleadings under the state-court (Texas) pleading standard and resolving factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.
- Defendants relied on Waffle House and other authorities to argue common-law claims are preempted by TCHRA claims; defendants also raised hearsay and qualified-privilege defenses.
- The court concluded there is a reasonable possibility Patton can recover against Long and Aycock on her common-law claims and GRANTED remand to state court; it declined to award fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Long and Aycock were improperly joined, permitting federal diversity jurisdiction | Joinder proper; pleadings state viable common-law claims against coworkers | Removal proper because coworkers were sham/improperly joined to destroy diversity | Joinder not improper; reasonable possibility of recovery against coworkers — remand granted |
| Whether Waffle House precludes Patton's common-law claims against coworkers | Patton asserts claims against coworkers rest on different facts than TCHRA claims against employer | Defendants assert Waffle House bars overlapping common-law claims as a matter of law | Waffle House does not bar intentional tort claims against individual coworkers; defendants’ reading is too broad |
| Whether Patton can plead slander/slander per se given alleged opinion/hearsay | Patton alleges false factual accusations (e.g., calling her racist), not mere opinion; pleadings suffice pre-discovery | Defendants contend statements are opinion/hearsay and thus not actionable | Hearsay and opinion defenses premature at pleading stage; pleadings allow possibility of recovery |
| Whether qualified privilege or Mumfrey forecloses tortious-interference and other common-law claims | Patton contends alleged malice negates any qualified privilege; claims distinct from employer TCHRA claim | Defendants cite qualified privilege and Mumfrey to show claims untenable | Court declines to resolve on merits; alleged malice could defeat privilege and claims raise a possibility of recovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Salazar v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 455 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (improper-joinder doctrine allows removal only when no reasonable possibility plaintiff can recover against non-diverse defendants)
- Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (standard for evaluating improper joinder; Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis)
- Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2010) (TCHRA-related negligence claims against employer may preempt overlapping common-law claims)
- Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2013) (addressing viability of tortious-interference claims in employment context)
- Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003) (burden on party asserting improper joinder is heavy)