Patton Boggs, LLP v. CHEVRON CORPORATION
791 F. Supp. 2d 13
D.D.C.2011Background
- Patton Boggs represents Lago Agrio plaintiffs against Chevron in Ecuador and in U.S. litigation, with Breaux Lott Group owned by Patton Boggs.
- Breaux Lott previously provided lobbying services for Chevron; Chevron terminated that relationship and Patton Boggs acquired Breaux Lott in 2010.
- Patton Boggs appeared for Lago Agrio plaintiffs in the Second Circuit, prompting Chevron to threaten potential disqualification and demand a response by November 16, 2010.
- Patton Boggs filed suit in November 2010 seeking a declaratory judgment that Breaux Lott's prior non-legal work does not disqualify Patton Boggs from representing the Lago Agrio plaintiffs.
- Chevron moved to dismiss; Patton Boggs cross-moved to strike Chevron's motion and sought leave to amend to add tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims.
- The court denied Patton Boggs's motion to amend and granted Chevron's motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leave to amend for tort claims | Patton Boggs asserts addition of tort claims is viable. | Amendment would be futile; claims fail under Rule 12(b)(6). | Denied; amendment futile |
| Tortious interference theory under DC law | Uses Restatement § 766A theory to show damages absent breach. | DC law requires a breach or identifiable damages; § 766A not applicable here. | Denied; theory improper; damages not pled |
| Tortious interference with attorney-client relationship | Interference with attorney-client relationship is a distinct tort. | No separate DC tort; treated as interference with contract/business relationship. | Denied; not a cognizable separate tort |
| Civil conspiracy claim | Based on the same underlying acts as the interference claims. | Civil conspiracy requires an underlying tort; none viable. | Denied; no viable underlying tort |
Key Cases Cited
- Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 953 A.2d 308 (D.C. 2008) (tortious interference requires existence of a contract and interference causing damages)
- Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (contract interference elements; DC view on essential elements)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plaintiff must plead enough to state a plausible claim)
- Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading standard requires more than mere conclusory statements)
- Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1972) (ripeness concerns and prospective actions)
- Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (U.S. 1990) (injury must be actual or imminent for standing/ripeness)
- Abbott Labs. v. Clali, 387 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1967) (ripeness prudential aspects in declaratory actions)
- Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1995) (district courts have discretion under DJA to abstain)
- Park v. Hyatt Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2006) (consider damages and breach in DC torts)
- In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (choice of law in federal courts where parties assume DC law)
- Moro v. Shell Oil Co., No official reporter (cited in analysis) (Detailed in opinion) (procedural considerations for reconsideration)