Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas
307 Kan. 616
| Kan. | 2018Background
- Two occupants drowned when their vehicle left a rural township road that ended at the Arkansas River; the road transitioned from a paved county road (322nd Road) to an unpaved township segment that terminated near the river.
- County had posted a "Pavement Ends" sign ~600 feet before the unpaved section; no barricade, dead-end, or object-marker signs existed on the township portion near the river.
- Plaintiffs sued Bolton Township, Cowley County, and KDWPT alleging negligent failure to provide warnings/signs/barriers; KDWPT summary judgment was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
- District court granted summary judgment to the Township (no statutory duty to place traffic-control devices) and granted the County summary judgment on some claims but denied it on others; interlocutory appeals followed and were consolidated.
- Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part; the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed (1) whether the Township owed a duty to place devices, (2) whether the County had a duty to conduct an engineering study, and (3) whether the County is immune under the Kansas Tort Claims Act discretionary-function/signage exceptions.
- Kansas Supreme Court held: (a) Township owed no duty to install traffic-control devices under the statutes; (b) MUTCD did not impose a duty to conduct a broad engineering survey/study as alleged; and (c) the County was immune under KTCA discretionary-function/sign placement exceptions for the signage decisions at issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bolton Township owed a legal duty to place traffic-control devices on the township road | Patterson: township statutes (general charge/supervision) and K.S.A. 68-526 impose duty to place/maintain traffic-control devices | Township: statutes limit sign-placement authority to specified entities/counties; township lacks ordinance/regulatory authority over vehicular traffic | Held: No duty — townships generally are not "local authorities" for sign placement and only townships in five enumerated counties have that specific statutory duty; summary judgment affirmed for Township |
| Whether Cowley County had a duty to conduct an engineering study to determine signage on the county portion of 322nd Road | Patterson: MUTCD requires warning-sign placement be based on an engineering study or engineering judgment, implying a duty to study roads/conditions | County: MUTCD requires study only when deciding to place signs; it does not require blanket surveys or force a study where MUTCD treats sign use as optional | Held: No duty — MUTCD does not obligate counties to conduct a jurisdiction-wide or initial engineering study as alleged |
| Whether County is immune under KTCA (discretionary-function and signage exceptions) for failing to place advisory speed, Dead End, or No Outlet signs | Patterson: decision was not discretionary because MUTCD's criteria/"totality of circumstances" could make sign placement mandatory; factual issues preclude summary judgment on immunity | County: MUTCD classifies use of these signs as options; decision to place them involves discretion grounded in public policy and the MUTCD; KTCA exceptions apply | Held: County immune — MUTCD treats advisory speed and Dead End/No Outlet signs as permissive Options; where MUTCD leaves sign placement to authority, KTCA discretionary-function/placement exception bars liability; summary judgment for County affirmed |
| Whether MUTCD/precedent required detailed guidelines converting professional judgments into non-discretionary duties | Patterson: prior cases and MUTCD language require considering totality and can transform decisions into ministerial/professional judgments | County: MUTCD currently contains Option-level guidance for the signs at issue; Carpenter analysis applies only where MUTCD contains mandatory standards or detailed guidelines | Held: MUTCD governs; because current MUTCD provisions for these signs are Options (permissive), County retained discretion and immunity applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Shirley v. Glass, 297 Kan. 888 (statutory duty requires satisfying negligence duty elements)
- Berry v. National Medical Servs., Inc., 292 Kan. 917 (existence of legal duty is a question of law)
- Toumberlin v. Haas, 236 Kan. 138 (scope of highway-maintenance duty depends on circumstances)
- Carpenter v. Johnson, 231 Kan. 783 (MUTCD can convert sign-placement into professional judgment within guidelines and limit discretionary immunity)
- Finkbiner v. Clay County, 238 Kan. 856 (township-responsibility context; court relied on parties' agreement about maintenance responsibility)
- Keiswetter v. State, 304 Kan. 362 (when facts uncontroverted, KTCA exception applicability is question of law)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (federal discretionary-function framework referenced)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (federal discretionary-function framework referenced)