PATSY CUSTER v. WAL-MART STORES EAST I, LP, Defendant-Respondent.
492 S.W.3d 212
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Patsy Custer sued Wal‑Mart after slipping and falling in the store near the produce/onion bin on January 8, 2014; she reported feeling something “wet and mushy,” like an onion skin or lettuce leaf, under her foot.
- Wal‑Mart moved for summary judgment arguing Custer produced no evidence that a condition of the floor caused her fall.
- Wal‑Mart’s statement of uncontroverted facts largely quoted deposition testimony verbatim rather than identifying ultimate element facts with record citations as required by Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.04.
- Custer denied key parts of Wal‑Mart’s submission and supported her response with deposition excerpts: her own sensation, her husband’s eyewitness observation of her foot slipping, her daughter’s statements, prior employee testimony that onion pieces had been found near the onions, and employees with mops near the scene shortly after the fall.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, finding no one observed any remnant of a hazard and that Custer’s account amounted to speculation; Custer appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Custer’s circumstantial evidence created a genuine dispute on causation and that Wal‑Mart had not met summary judgment standards under Missouri law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on causation | Custer: her sensation, eyewitness observation of slipping, family statements, employees’ prior admissions about onion debris, and employees with mops create circumstantial evidence that something on the floor caused the fall | Wal‑Mart: no witness found debris, no physical evidence on the floor or on shoes; Custer’s impressions are uncorroborated speculation | Reversed: Circumstantial evidence and differing reasonable inferences create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation, precluding summary judgment |
| Whether Wal‑Mart complied with Rule 74.04 in stating uncontroverted facts | Custer: Wal‑Mart improperly recited deposition testimony as material facts rather than citing evidence to negate element facts | Wal‑Mart: framed deposition excerpts as undisputed facts supporting its motion | Held: Wal‑Mart’s approach was flawed; movant must state ultimate material facts with specific record citations; mischaracterizing testimony impeded proper response under Rule 74.04 |
| Proper standard for reviewing circumstantial proof at summary judgment | Custer: circumstantial evidence can be sufficient; injured plaintiffs may lack direct proof and should get benefit of reasonable inferences | Wal‑Mart: circumstantial proof must be strong—physical corroboration required; otherwise mere speculation | Held: Court applies de novo review, gives non‑movant benefit of reasonable inferences; two plausible but contradictory accounts create a genuine issue for trial |
| Applicability of precedents requiring physical corroboration (e.g., Smith) | Custer: Smith is distinguishable because there was no time lapse and immediate circumstantial evidence here | Wal‑Mart: relies on Smith and other cases to argue lack of post‑fall physical evidence defeats causation | Held: Smith is distinguishable; Georgescu, Lindsay and other authorities support that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient when no significant time lapse exists |
Key Cases Cited
- ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid‑Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993) (summary‑judgment procedure and movant/nonmovant burdens; non‑movant gets benefit of reasonable inferences)
- Georgescu v. K Mart Corp., 813 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. banc 1991) (circumstantial evidence can support causation where debris was seen at the aisle without a time lapse)
- Wallingsford v. City of Maplewood, 287 S.W.3d 682 (Mo. banc 2009) (a genuine issue exists where record shows two plausible but contradictory accounts)
- Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 S.W.3d 450 (Mo. banc 2011) (material/ultimate facts versus evidentiary matters in summary‑judgment practice)
- Lindsay v. Mazzio’s Corp., 136 S.W.3d 915 (Mo. App. 2004) (reversal of summary judgment where immediate post‑fall statements by others created a genuine issue)
- Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 781 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. banc 1989) (consideration of relative evidentiary availability and that injured customers may lack direct proof)
- Smith v. Seven‑Eleven, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. App. 1968) (distinguished where proof failed to show alleged defect existed at time of fall)