643 S.W.3d 387
Tex.2022Background
- In March 2019 the San Antonio City Council voted (6-4, 1 abstention) to amend an airport concession agreement to exclude Chick-fil-A; the vote preceded the relevant statute.
- Texas enacted Chapter 2400 (the "Save Chick-fil-A law"), effective September 1, 2019, prohibiting governmental entities from taking adverse actions based wholly or partly on support for religious organizations and providing declaratory/injunctive relief and attorney’s fees; Section 2400.004 states immunity is "waived and abolished to the extent of liability" where a person "alleges a violation of Section 2400.002."
- Four days after the law took effect, five individuals sued the City (Chick-fil-A and Paradies later dropped or were not parties), alleging the City’s exclusion of Chick-fil-A violates §2400.002 and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
- The City moved to dismiss for governmental immunity and lack of standing; the trial court denied the plea, the court of appeals reversed on immunity grounds and dismissed, and the Texas Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court held petitioners’ live pleading failed to allege facts showing a post-September 1, 2019 adverse action (so immunity was not waived), but because the complaint did not affirmatively negate jurisdiction the plaintiffs must be given leave to replead; the Court declined to resolve standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of governmental immunity under §2400.004 | Alleging a violation of §2400.002 is sufficient to invoke the statute’s waiver | Chapter 2400 requires factual allegations of a post-effective‑date adverse action to waive immunity | Pleading insufficient—no alleged action on/after Sept. 1, 2019; immunity not invoked, but plaintiffs may replead |
| Temporal scope: does March 21, 2019 Council vote constitute adverse action | Exclusion is ongoing; the pre‑effective vote can support a continuing violation after Sept. 1, 2019 | The Council vote occurred before the statute took effect and cannot be an adverse action under Chapter 2400 | Vote cannot constitute adverse action because it predated the statute’s effective date |
| Pleading standard to invoke waiver | §2400.004’s language means a conclusory allegation of violation suffices | Statutes that waive immunity require plaintiffs to "actually allege" statutory elements with supporting facts | Court requires factual pleading that describes post‑effective‑date "actions" amounting to prohibited "adverse action" (citing Lueck, Miranda) |
| Standing | Chapter 2400 creates a private cause of action allowing anyone to sue without separate injury‑in‑fact; denial of preferred airport food is a concrete injury | Plaintiffs must show a concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury fairly traceable to defendant that a decision will redress | Court declined to decide standing now; defers to remand after plaintiffs file a live pleading |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. 2009) (holding that when a statute waives immunity for one who "alleges a violation," the plaintiff must "actually allege" the statute’s elements to invoke waiver)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (TTCA waiver requires pleading facts establishing statutory elements of liability)
- Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) ( Legislature must waive municipal immunity clearly and unambiguously)
- Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. 2019) (governmental immunity principles for political subdivisions)
- Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2003) (distinguishing immunity from suit and immunity from liability)
- Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (plaintiff must plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate lack of governmental immunity)
- Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2021) (adopting federal requirements for standing in Texas)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (Congressional cause of action does not eliminate the need to show a concrete harm for Article III standing)
- In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2020) (standing/credible‑threat analysis discussed in concurrence)