Patrick Pence and Jodee Pence v. S&D Builders, LLC S&D Development, LLC Lange Custom Builders, LLC Steven M. Lange Summit Oak Homes, LLC And David C. Oestreich, 07-16-00005-CV

In 2005 the Pences contracted with S&D Builders for construction of a home and later alleged numerous defects and filing administrative complaints.
The Pences sued S&D in late 2007 for breach of contract and other claims and requested a jury trial; the case experienced repeated delays, counsel changes, and multiple transfers to the trial court’s "drop docket."
The court twice required motions to retain the case (2009 and 2013); the court set trial dates and the parties at times agreed to arbitration, but arbitration did not proceed and activity was sporadic.
S&D invoked arbitration, later filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy (staying proceedings), and in 2015 agreed by facsimile to waive arbitration rights and litigate, then immediately moved to dismiss for want of prosecution under Rule 165a and the court’s inherent power.
The Pences promptly requested a jury setting for January 18, 2016; the court set a nonjury alternative for December 1, 2015, but after a scheduling issue the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution without giving new notice of its intent to dismiss.
The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding dismissal without adequate notice violated due process and was an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal for want of prosecution was proper	Pences: dismissal was improper because they exercised diligence and lacked adequate notice of court's new intent to dismiss	S&D: Rule 165a and court’s inherent power permitted dismissal after prolonged dormancy	Reversed — dismissal was an abuse of discretion because court failed to provide the required notice before dismissing
Whether Rule 165a or inherent power justified dismissal	Pences: no adequate procedural notice under Rule 165a or inherent-power standards	S&D: relied on Rule 165a and inherent power given long delay	Court reversed without specifying ground because notice requirement not met
Whether prior agreements (waiver of arbitration/setting for trial) affected dismissal	Pences: parties had agreed to litigate and set trial; dismissal thus improper	S&D: grounds for dismissal existed despite prior communications	Court credited lack of notice over parties’ prior communications and found dismissal improper
Whether prolonged docket time alone justified dismissal	Pences: delays caused by S&D, bankruptcy, and failed arbitration efforts; not solely Pences’ fault	S&D: eight years dormant justified dismissal	Court: exasperation understandable but procedural due-process notice required; dismissal vacated

Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing Rule 165a and the court's inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution)
General Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture, 811 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1991) (requiring notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissal for want of prosecution)
Donnell v. Spring Sports, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996) (failure to give adequate notice of intent to dismiss requires reversal)
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2010) (standard for abuse of discretion review)
Rizk v. Mayad, 603 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980) (inherent power to dismiss when plaintiff fails to prosecute)
Seals v. Seals, 83 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002) (affirmation on any proper ground when dismissal order doesn't specify reasons)
James B. Bonham Corp. v. City of Corsicana, 528 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016) (abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing dismissals for want of prosecution)