236 A.3d 171
Vt.2020Background
- Plaintiffs are Vermont DOC inmates with opioid-use disorder who allege the DOC’s medication-assisted treatment (MAT) program violates statutory standards (28 V.S.A. §§ 801, 801b).
- DOC grievance rules require inmates to pursue an informal complaint, then formal grievance, then appeals (including to the Commissioner), and to exhaust administrative remedies before litigation.
- Plaintiff Mullinnex filed grievance forms beginning Sept. 20, 2018, appealed to the corrections executive and to the Commissioner, and filed a civil action the same day he submitted the appeal to the Commissioner.
- The superior court deemed Mullinnex to have exhausted, adopted the federal “vicarious-exhaustion” doctrine (one class member’s exhaustion suffices for the class), and certified parts of the class under V.R.C.P. 23.
- Defendants appealed, arguing Mullinnex had not exhausted (he filed suit before agency response periods expired) and thus the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding Mullinnex failed to exhaust and did not qualify for exhaustion exceptions (unavailability or substantial compliance).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Mullinnex exhaust administrative remedies before suing? | Mullinnex filed the required grievance forms and appealed; DOC failed to respond, so exhaustion satisfied. | He filed the civil suit before waiting for agency responses and thus did not exhaust. | Mullinnex did not exhaust; trial court abused its discretion in deeming exhaustion satisfied. |
| Can vicarious exhaustion (one class member’s exhaustion binds the class) justify class filing? | Vicarious-exhaustion applies and Mullinnex’s grievances satisfy class exhaustion. | Even if doctrine recognized, it requires at least one class member to have exhausted; Mullinnex did not. | Court declined to rule on doctrinal adoption because no class member exhausted; doctrine inapplicable here. |
| Do exceptions to exhaustion (unavailability or substantial compliance) apply? | Mullinnex argued DOC was effectively unresponsive or he substantially complied. | DOC showed Mullinnex appealed prematurely and did not wait the prescribed response periods. | Exceptions do not apply on this record; plaintiff failed to show unavailability or substantial compliance. |
| Should the class certification under V.R.C.P. 23 be upheld? | Plaintiffs argued the class met numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. | Defendants argued Rule 23 requirements and exhaustion were not met. | Court did not reach Rule 23 merits because lack of exhaustion divested subject-matter jurisdiction; certification reversed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stone v. Errecart, 675 A.2d 1322 (discusses exhaustion as statutory vs. judge-made and governs exceptions)
- Jordan v. State, 702 A.2d 58 (explains exhaustion protects agency authority and promotes judicial efficiency)
- Pratt v. Pallito, 167 A.3d 320 (reiterates lack of exhaustion deprives court of subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Luck Bros., Inc. v. Agency of Transp., 99 A.3d 997 (places burden on party seeking to bypass administrative remedies)
- McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (framework on judicial discretion when legislature hasn’t required exhaustion)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (addresses exhaustion standards under PLRA and related principles)
- Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278 (example of federal vicarious-exhaustion doctrine)
- Conley v. Crisafulli, 99 A.3d 677 (procedure for reviewing motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction)
