842 S.E.2d 455
W. Va.2020Background
- In 2016 the West Virginia Legislature enacted the Workplace Freedom Act (S.B.1), amending W. Va. Code § 21-1A-3 and adding W. Va. Code § 21-5G to prohibit requiring employees, as a condition of employment or its continuation, to pay union dues, fees, assessments, or equivalent third‑party payments.
- Several labor organizations (AFL‑CIO affiliates and locals) and one individual employee sued, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the Act violated the West Virginia Constitution (association rights, Takings Clause/property, and liberty/due process).
- The circuit court granted a preliminary injunction and later (on remand, with no new evidence) entered partial summary judgment for the unions, ruling the Act unconstitutional. The State appealed.
- The West Virginia Supreme Court had earlier reversed the preliminary injunction in Morrisey I (239 W. Va. 633) and remanded. On this appeal the Supreme Court considered the constitutional challenges on the merits.
- The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court: it held the Act does not violate West Virginia constitutional protections for association, property/takings, or liberty/due process, and remanded for entry of summary judgment for the State.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ban on compelled dues violates association rights (W. Va. Const. art. III, §§7,16) | Ban penalizes unions by enabling free riders who get representation without paying, thus impeding unions’ collective associational activities | Act leaves voluntary association intact; it merely prohibits coercion and states may decline to subsidize association | Rejected: statute does not violate association rights; states may forbid compelled dues and refusal to subsidize does not infringe association |
| Whether the ban effects an unconstitutional taking of union property or services (art. III, §9) | Prohibiting compelled dues appropriates unions’ services for nonpaying beneficiaries and deprives unions of property/expectation of dues | No cognizable property right in a unilateral expectation of future dues; duty to represent nonmembers derives from federal law and the exclusive‑representation benefits compensate unions | Rejected: no taking; duties arise from federal law and exclusive‑representative benefits offset burdens; prospective statute did not seize union property |
| Whether the ban infringes liberty interests (art. III, §§3,10) | Forcing unions to provide costly services without dues is arbitrary and deprives unions of liberty to use their resources | Act imposes no duty to provide services; any duty (duty of fair representation) is federal and optional via choice to be exclusive rep | Rejected: no liberty infringement; Act does not itself compel union service and does not violate due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (struck compelled public‑sector agency fees; emphasized protection against compelled subsidy of private speech)
- Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (limits on use of compelled dues for political purposes and discussion of the financial core)
- Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (closed‑shop prohibition does not violate freedom of speech/association)
- NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled disclosure of membership likely chills association; the Court recognized associative privacy and chilling effects)
- Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (distinguishes intimate vs. expressive association and describes permissible government interference categories)
- Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL‑CIO, 239 W. Va. 633, 804 S.E.2d 883 (2017) (prior WV decision reversing preliminary injunction; provided framework applied on remand)