Patrick McLemore v. Thomas Bell, 503 F. App'x 398

Background

McLemore, then 16, and Reid burglarized Oscar Manning's home and Manning was killed during the spree; items stolen included a VCR, a ring, and Manning's car.
McLemore admitted involvement and claimed Reid acted first; he claimed he stayed in the garage or later fled; physical and testimonial evidence pointed toward Reid as the mastermind.
Reid pleaded no contest to related charges; neither Reid nor McLemore’s trial called Reid as a witness, and the state presented friends' statements instead.
Trial resulted in felony-murder and related offenses; judge vacated armed-robbery and home-invasion convictions on double jeopardy grounds, imposing concurrent life on felony-murder and lengthy carjacking sentence.
State appellate courts denied relief; McLemore filed a habeas corpus petition alleging multiple federal-constitutional violations; district court denied relief.
The court reviews under AEDPA, applying the “unreasonable application” or “contrary to” standard to state-court adjudications on the merits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jury instructions on aiding and abetting and unanimity	McLemore argues instructions were inadequate and ambiguous, risking conviction on aiding and abetting for felony murder.	State contends the charge read as a whole correctly instructed on intent and unanimity, avoiding error.	No due process violation; instructions viewed as a whole supported proper conviction.
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing and burden shifting	Prosecutor comments misled the jury and improperly framed liability for aiding and abetting.	Comments were not improper or flagrant; they fit within permissible argument under the law and evidence.	No reversible error; conduct not shown to deny due process.
Exclusion of Copeland testimony (hearsay) and right to present a defense	Exclusion of Reid’s statements via Copeland violated McLemore’s right to present a defense.	Hearsay rules appropriately bar Copeland’s statements absent unavailable declarant; no error in excluding.	No constitutional error; evidentiary ruling within state evidentiary rules.
Ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel	Counsel failed to preserve and present errors; appellate counsel failed to raise ineffective-assistance claims.	No prejudice from alleged deficiencies; claims lack merit on the merits.	No prejudice; no constitutional error from counsel performance.
Procedural default and cause to excuse default	Defaulted claims should be excused by trial/appellate-counsel ineffectiveness as cause.	Procedural default bars review absent adequate cause and prejudice; no sufficient cause shown for all claims.	Courts addressed merits instead of default issues; petition denied on the merits.

Key Cases Cited

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (requires a due-process-standard review of jury instructions)
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (due-process review of jury-charge effects in aggregate)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (unreasonable-application standard for AEDPA review)
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (AEDPA framework applies to post-1996 petitions)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (prosecutorial misconduct standard; must be improper and flagrant)
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (cause to excuse procedural default via ineffective assistance)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (fundamental right to present a defense)
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (limits and rules on admissible defense testimony)
Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (procedural-default framework for habeas petitions)
Arias v. Hudson, 589 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (merits-focused approach over procedural-default analysis)
Mahdi v. Bagley, 522 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2008) (addressing the interplay of merits and default in habeas review)