Patrick Kincaid v. Government of the District of Columbia
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7223
| D.C. Cir. | 2017Background
- D.C.'s post-and-forfeit statute permits arrestees charged with certain misdemeanors to pay a preset sum (commonly $25–$50) to resolve the charge immediately without a conviction or court appearance; Superior Court sets the amounts.
- The statute requires a form explaining rights: the arrestee may accept post-and-forfeit, or proceed through the criminal process with full procedural protections; acceptance must be signed. A forfeiture can be set aside within 90 days to contest the charge.
- Patrick Kincaid accepted a post-and-forfeit offer after an open-container arrest, signed the form, but later sued on behalf of a class claiming the procedure is unconstitutional.
- Kincaid’s principal claims: (1) procedural due process violation — deprivation of property (money) without a hearing; (2) void‑for‑vagueness — statute grants police excessive discretion to offer or withhold the post‑and‑forfeit option.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim; this appeal followed. The D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post‑and‑forfeit violates procedural due process by depriving property without a hearing | Kincaid: the procedure coerces arrestees to forfeit money and forgo hearings, so they are deprived of property without due process | D.C.: the procedure is voluntary, offers an alternative to traditional process, and arrestees keep the option to litigate (including setting aside a forfeiture) | Court: No due process violation — Medina test applies and post‑and‑forfeit is neither historically forbidden nor fundamentally unfair; choice is voluntary and analogous to plea bargaining |
| Whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it grants police discretion to offer or deny post‑and‑forfeit | Kincaid: police discretion is standardless and invites arbitrary enforcement | D.C.: offenses and amounts are defined by statute and court rules; discretion to offer the option does not render the law vague | Court: Vagueness challenge fails — doctrine likely inapplicable, and prosecutorial/enforcement discretion alone does not make statute void for vagueness |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (procedural due process balancing test)
- Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (heightened test for criminal procedure claims: deeply rooted tradition or fundamental fairness)
- United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (pressure to waive rights in plea negotiations is permissible)
- Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (upholding plea-like forfeiture arrangements under constitutional scrutiny)
- United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (enforcement discretion among overlapping statutes does not create vagueness)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (discretion in selecting penalties within statutory range does not make a scheme vague)
