Patrick Kearns v. United States, 23 F.4th 807

Rideout, a VHA radiologist at the Iowa City VA Medical Center, reported alleged unsafe conduct by technologist Jeffrey Dettbarn (and union president Patrick Kearns) to internal supervisors and external authorities; plaintiffs sued Rideout in Iowa state court for defamation and related torts.
The United States removed the case under the FTCA and the government certified (via Attorney General) that Rideout acted within the scope of his employment; the district court substituted the United States for Rideout and later dismissed the case.
Rideout’s disclosures included reports to supervisors, the Iowa credentialing/licensing boards, the Iowa Department of Public Health, and a staffer for Senator Grassley; VHA whistleblower policy authorized reporting to oversight bodies and, in many circumstances, disclosure of de-identified information.
Contemporaneous emails and supervisory responses showed Rideout’s reporting was known to and not rebuked by management; time/place (on-duty, at the hospital) and foreseeability favored agency authorization.
Plaintiffs argued Rideout’s true purpose was retaliatory and that the government’s certification should be rebutted; the court held the other scope-of-employment factors outweighed intent and affirmed substitution without an evidentiary hearing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the AG's FTCA scope-of-employment certification should be rebutted	Kearns/Dettbarn: Rideout acted outside scope—his reports were personal/retaliatory and not authorized	US/Rideout: Reporting fell within authorized VHA whistleblower processes and concerned patient safety	Court: Plaintiffs failed to present specific facts creating a genuine dispute; Rideout acted within scope; certification upheld
Whether an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve scope	Plaintiffs: Credibility and circumstantial evidence create material fact issues requiring a hearing	Government: Documentary evidence and supervisory responses resolve material facts; hearing unnecessary	Court: No material factual dispute on dispositive factors; hearing not required
Role of employee intent in scope analysis under Iowa law	Plaintiffs: Rideout’s retaliatory motive renders his acts outside employment	Government: Intent is only one factor; authorization, foreseeability, time/place, and employer control matter more	Court: Intent alone is not dispositive; other factors show acts served VHA purposes and remained within scope

Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (certification does not conclusively establish scope; court must decide if challenged)
Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff bears burden to rebut certification; court must determine scope if challenged)
McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1995) (evidentiary hearing required if material fact issues exist)
Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1991) (substitution disputes to be resolved promptly; hearing when facts contested)
United States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2016) (apply summary-judgment standard when assessing material fact disputes over substitution)
Lawson v. United States, 103 F.3d 59 (8th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff must come forward with specific facts rebutting certification)
Wilcox v. United States, 881 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review: de novo for substitution order)
Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1999) (Iowa test: act must be same general nature as authorized or incidental; substantial deviation bars scope)
Sandman v. Hagan, 154 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1967) (employee act may be within scope if necessary to accomplish employment purpose and intended for that purpose)
Vlotho v. Hardin County, 509 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1993) (scope factors: authorization, time/place, purpose, foreseeability)