Patrick Hlavaty & Jeff Strnadel v. Commercial State Bank of El Campo, Texas, Inc., 13-14-00516-CV

Background

Commercial State Bank sued multiple defendants including Hlavaty and Strnadel in 2009; Hlavaty and Strnadel filed counterclaims including Rule 13 sanctions and breach-of-employment/quantum meruit claims in 2011.
The Bank filed successive nonsuits as to various defendants between 2010 and 2013; the final agreed nonsuit regarding the remaining non-individual defendants was signed November 15, 2013.
The trial court entered multiple discovery-related orders against the Bank (2010–2013), some addressing production and carrying the request for sanctions forward.
On June 3, 2014 the trial court issued a Final Order purporting to strike Hlavaty and Strnadel’s amended counterclaims and stated plenary jurisdiction had expired; on June 11, 2014 it entered an Order of Sanctions against the Bank.
Cross‑Appellees (Hlavaty & Strnadel) argue the nonsuit orders were not final as they did not dispose of the pending sanctions and other counterclaims, so the trial court retained jurisdiction; they contend the June 3 Final Order should be reversed and the June 11 sanctions order should be affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Bank)	Defendant's Argument (Hlavaty/Strnadel)	Held (Cross‑Appellees' position)
Did the trial court lose plenary jurisdiction after the nonsuits such that the June 11 sanctions order is void?	Nonsuit(s) ended the case and started the plenary clock; court lacked jurisdiction when it signed sanctions post‑expiration.	Nonsuit orders were not final because they did not dispose of the pending sanctions and amended counterclaims; court retained jurisdiction.	Trial court retained jurisdiction in June 2014; nonsuits were not final/appealable, so sanctions are valid.
Were the nonsuit orders final as to Hlavaty and Strnadel’s counterclaims (including Rule 13 sanctions)?	The nonsuits disposed of claims and triggered the thirty‑day plenary period.	Nonsuits did not reference or dispose of the sanctions or amended counterclaims; therefore the requests survived.	Nonsuits did not expressly dispose of sanctions; sanctions remained pending and preserved trial court jurisdiction.
Was the trial court’s sanction order procedurally and substantively proper?	The Bank argues Rule 13 requirements and particularity/evidence supporting fees were insufficient.	Sanctions were grounded in the court’s inherent power for bad‑faith litigation conduct; prior discovery orders and hearings provided notice and evidentiary basis for fees.	The court properly exercised inherent authority, followed due process, and evidence in the record (hearings, fee statements) supports monetary award.
Were any appellate objections waived?	N/A (Bank preserved jurisdiction objection)	Bank failed to preserve non‑jurisdictional attacks to earlier discovery orders and other procedural complaints.	Bank waived challenges to the earlier orders other than the jurisdiction claim; appellate review should consider full record.

Key Cases Cited

Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2009) (dismissal does not automatically terminate trial court jurisdiction over a sanctions motion unless the dismissal expressly disposes of it)
Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. 2009) (sanctions motions filed contemporaneously with nonsuit may survive nonsuit; court may consider sanctions after dismissal)
CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner's Assoc., Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2013) (post‑nonsuit jurisdiction principles and finality analysis)
Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992) (Texas courts possess inherent power to sanction bad‑faith litigation conduct)
Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2003) (due‑process and particularity limits on sanctions; sanctions must be tied to offending party and remedial)
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (plenary jurisdiction and finality principles)