Patrick Fehlman v. James Mankowski, 74 F.4th 872

Fehlman, former interim Neillsville police chief who returned to a rank-and-file officer after Mankowski was hired as permanent chief, complained about Mankowski’s leadership and conduct.
Fehlman and other officers requested and attended a Police & Fire Commission (PFC) meeting (closed session) to report concerns including: fear of retaliation, an unprofessional "stripper pole" comment, orders to turn off body cameras, verbal abuse of suspects, radio-procedure changes affecting safety, and deprioritizing a child-abuse allegation.
After the PFC meeting, Mankowski allegedly harassed Fehlman (removed a work credit card, threatened insubordination charges), interfered with his later employment, altered his personnel file, delayed unemployment benefits, and banned him from NPD premises.
Fehlman resigned, was hired elsewhere, and sued Mankowski under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation; the district court dismissed under Garcetti.
Fehlman concedes his direct complaints to Mankowski were unprotected but appeals the dismissal as to his PFC statements and argues post-employment retaliation should be actionable.
The Seventh Circuit affirms: Fehlman’s PFC remarks were made pursuant to his official duties (thus unprotected), and post-employment timing does not change that result.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fehlman's statements to the PFC were made as a private citizen (protected) or pursuant to official duties (unprotected)	Fehlman: presenting misconduct about the chief to the PFC was as a citizen because subordinates lack a statutory mechanism to file charges upward	Mankowski: PFC is a supervisory body with statutory authority over police; speaking to it is part of internal duties and chain of command	Court: Speech to the PFC was made in Fehlman's capacity as an employee and is unprotected under Garcetti
Whether post-employment retaliation is actionable if the underlying speech was unprotected while employed	Fehlman: Garcetti’s policy rationale shouldn’t bar post-employment retaliation claims	Mankowski: If speech is not constitutionally protected, subsequent retaliation (during or after employment) cannot support a First Amendment claim	Court: No actionable claim — unprotected speech cannot form the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim regardless of timing

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (public-employee speech made pursuant to official duties is not protected by the First Amendment)
McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 705 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013) (statements about misconduct within an employee’s responsibility qualify as official-capacity speech)
Forgue v. City of Chicago, 873 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2017) (police duty to report official misconduct is a basic part of the job)
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008) (testifying to an oversight body was discharging official responsibilities rather than speaking as a private citizen)
Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing internal complaints made pursuant to duties from citizen reports)
Sweet v. Town of Bargersville, 18 F.4th 273 (7th Cir. 2021) (prima facie elements for First Amendment retaliation)
Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2010) (speech-addressing-public-concern inquiry applies only if speech is by a private citizen)
Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2021) (standard of review on a motion to dismiss)