Patrick Baehr v. Creig Northrop Team, P.C., 953 F.3d 244

Background

In July 2008 Christine and Patrick Baehr (buyers) purchased a Maryland home; their buyer’s agent was Maija Dykstra, a member of The Creig Northrop Team (Northrop Defendants). Dykstra told them Lakeview Title Company (Lakeview Defendants) would provide settlement services; the Baehrs did not shop for other title providers.
The HUD-1 showed customary title-related charges; the Baehrs previously paid similar discretionary fees on an earlier purchase and paid slightly less in discretionary fees for this transaction.
The Operative Complaint (class action) alleges a kickback scheme: Lakeview paid monthly payments (via a sham marketing agreement) to The Northrop Team in exchange for exclusive referrals, depriving buyers of impartial competition in violation of RESPA § 2607(a); plaintiffs sought treble damages.
After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment arguing (1) lack of Article III standing because plaintiffs suffered no concrete injury and (2) RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations barred the claim absent equitable tolling. The district court granted summary judgment on standing (and alternatively on statute of limitations).
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and focused on whether the alleged deprivation of impartial and fair competition (and three alternative plaintiff theories) constituted a concrete injury-in-fact under Article III following Spokeo.
The Fourth Circuit held the Baehrs lacked Article III standing because (a) deprivation of impartial/fair competition alone — absent evidence it increased settlement costs or otherwise caused real-world harm — is not a concrete injury Congress meant to prevent under RESPA; and (b) the Baehrs’ three alternative theories (fiduciary-duty/overcharge, unjust enrichment, unlawful-transaction) likewise failed to show a concrete injury. Court vacated summary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether deprivation of impartial and fair competition under RESPA § 2607(a) is a concrete injury for Article III standing	Baehr: RESPA’s prohibition against kickbacks makes deprivation of impartial/fair competition a legally cognizable concrete injury even without an overcharge	Defs: A statutory violation alone, without real-world harm (e.g., increased settlement costs), is not a concrete injury	Held: Not a concrete injury; deprivation untethered to increased costs is a bare statutory violation insufficient for standing (Spokeo framework)
Whether fiduciary-duty/overcharge theory (broker owed duties to return kickbacks and provide impartial advice) supports standing	Baehr: Northrop owed fiduciary duties; failure converted reasonable fees into an overcharge causing injury	Defs: Under Maryland law the seller’s broker does not owe fiduciary duties to the buyer; no agency/fiduciary relationship shown	Held: Failed — no fiduciary relationship established under Maryland law, so theory cannot supply injury-in-fact
Whether unjust enrichment (defendant’s gain) supplies plaintiff injury for standing	Baehr: Northrop’s receipt of kickbacks unjustly enriched defendants and thus injured plaintiffs	Defs: Unjust enrichment focuses on defendant’s gain, not plaintiff’s loss; defendant gain alone does not automatically equate to plaintiff concrete injury	Held: Failed — unjust enrichment centers on defendant’s gain and does not automatically create the plaintiff concrete injury required by Article III
Whether paying for settlement services provided in contravention of RESPA (unlawful-transaction theory) creates standing	Baehr: Payment for services rendered in violation of RESPA is itself an injury (analogizing to statutory remedies elsewhere)	Defs: Payment alone — when fees were reasonable and services provided — is only a procedural statute violation without concrete harm	Held: Failed — payment for lawful-fee services repackaged as a statutory violation is a bare procedural harm insufficient for Article III standing

Key Cases Cited

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (standing is jurisdictional and courts must dismiss if no Article III standing)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three elements of standing; injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (statutory violations do not automatically confer Article III standing; analyze historical practice and congressional judgment)
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (procedural-right deprivation without concrete interest insufficient for standing)
Boulware v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 291 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (RESPA aimed at practices that increase settlement costs; § 2607 targets kickbacks that tend to increase costs)
Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2017) (mere statutory violation unconnected to real-world harm is insufficient for concrete injury)
Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (recognizing Spokeo’s effect on prior circuit authority regarding concrete injury)
Wilkens Square LLLP v. W.C. Pinkard & Co., 984 A.2d 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (real estate broker fiduciary analysis under Maryland law)
Proctor v. Holden, 540 A.2d 133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (broker is agent for principal with fiduciary duties to that principal alone)
Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343 (Md. 2007) (elements and focus of unjust enrichment under Maryland law)