Patrick A. Neptune v. Philip Lanoue
178 So. 3d 520
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Lanoue, a city police officer, alleged Neptune stalked and harassed him after a traffic confrontation, prompting an injunction request.
- Neptune followed Lanoue into their neighborhood, confronted him about driving, and later disputes receipt of a seatbelt ticket and disclosure to Neptune’s parents.
- Neptune sent multiple letters to the police chief and other officials and sent at least three letters to Lanoue’s home.
- Neptune also posted Lanoue’s picture and a complaint about the incident on an online “copblock” site.
- The trial court entered a final injunction prohibiting Neptune from coming within 500 feet of Lanoue’s residence, from defacing Lanoue’s property, and from posting anything on the Internet regarding Lanoue.
- Neptune appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the stalking allegations/evidence and the injunction’s internet-posting ban as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Neptune's Argument | Lanoue's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petition alleged stalking under statute | Petition failed to allege statutory elements of stalking | Petition and evidence showed repeated communications and conduct toward Lanoue | Court rejected Neptune’s challenge and affirmed injunction generally |
| Whether evidence supported injunction | Insufficient evidence at trial to prove stalking | Evidence of letters, home mailings, and online posts supported injunction | Court found sufficient evidence to support injunction |
| Whether injunction’s Internet-posting ban violated First Amendment | Ban impermissibly broad and prevents criticism of public official | Ban was necessary to prevent cyberstalking and harassment | Court held the broad ban unconstitutional and must be narrowed or struck |
| Proper remedy and narrowing standard | Strike or limit provision that curtails public-issue speech | If retained, restriction must target only unprotected cyberstalking communications | Court affirmed injunction in part, reversed in part; remanded to strike or narrowly tailor internet restriction to communications directed at private matters causing substantial emotional distress and serving no legitimate purpose |
Key Cases Cited
- Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (not all speech has equal First Amendment importance)
- Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (distinguishing public from private speech protections)
- Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (speech on matters of public concern receives heightened protection)
- NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (public-issue expression is at the core of First Amendment values)
- Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (public concern standard for speech)
- Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (gathering information about officials and recording police is protected)
- Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (dissemination re: alleged governmental misconduct is core First Amendment speech)
- City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (right to verbally oppose police action is strongly protected)