384 P.3d 975
Idaho2016Background
- Pete Marek was killed in a large stope collapse at Hecla’s Lucky Friday Mine on April 15, 2011; his brother Mike was present and could not rescue him. MSHA found Hecla’s removal of a waste pillar constituted more than ordinary negligence and issued citations and fines.
- Mareks sued Hecla alleging the pillar removal amounted to conduct outside the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act exclusivity exception (I.C. § 72-209(3)). Hecla invoked the Act’s exclusivity as a bar to tort claims.
- On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held Mareks failed to show Hecla engaged in “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” and granted summary judgment for Hecla; Mareks’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
- The key factual disputes (e.g., warnings received, engineer review) were found immaterial because even gross negligence does not satisfy the § 72-209(3) standard.
- The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed: no evidence Hecla specifically intended to harm the employees or had actual knowledge the stope would collapse; therefore the exclusivity bar applied and summary judgment was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hecla’s conduct falls outside worker’s comp exclusivity under I.C. § 72-209(3) | Mareks: failing engineer review, ignoring experienced-worker warnings, violating MSHA rules and being sanctioned shows conduct tantamount to “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” | Hecla: conduct was negligent (even grossly) but not deliberate or with actual knowledge that collapse would occur; worker’s comp exclusivity applies. | Held: Affirmed for Hecla—no evidence of specific intent to harm or actual knowledge of imminent collapse, so § 72-209(3) does not apply. |
| Which party bears the burden on § 72-209(3) on summary judgment | Mareks: district court erred assigning burden to Mareks. | Hecla: once employer shows prima facie that injury is covered by Act, employee must prove exception applies. | Held: Employer proves injury falls under Act; employee bears burden to show the § 72-209(3) exception. |
| Whether disputed factual issues (warnings, approvals) preclude summary judgment | Mareks: factual disputes about warnings and approvals are material to intent/knowledge. | Hecla: those facts at best support negligence; without evidence of specific intent or actual knowledge, they’re immaterial to the statutory exception. | Held: Disputed facts are immaterial; summary judgment proper. |
| Whether individual employees/agents remain liable despite employer’s immunity | Mareks: several individual defendants should not be immune. | Hecla: § 72-209 immunity extends to officers, agents, servants, employees. | Held: Individual defendants are protected by the same exclusivity; immunity affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. Albertson’s Inc., 141 Idaho 524 (party invoking exclusivity bears initial burden to show injury covered by worker’s comp)
- Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755 (definition of "willful or unprovoked physical aggression" requires offensive action/hostile attack and intent)
- DeMoss v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (employer’s lack of actual knowledge and absence of intent preclude § 72-209(3) exception)
- Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7 (exception applied where complaint alleged employer knew hazard and ordered employee into it; default judgment context)
- Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847 (Worker’s Compensation Act as quid pro quo limiting employer liability)
- Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58 (summary judgment review standard)