Patricia Levine v. Louis DeJoy, 64 F.4th 789

Patricia Levine, an African‑American USPS employee with ~27 years’ service and an AA, BA, and MBA, applied in April 2015 for Supervisor of Customer Services at Grand Rapids MPO; Kathleen Peare (white) was selected.
Levine had substantial retail supervisory experience, multiple USPS awards, perfect mystery‑shopper scores while acting as Lead Clerk, and had previously served as acting supervisor; Mullins (the selecting official) later asked Levine to train Peare.
Peare had ~8 years USPS service, about 23 months as acting supervisor (primarily carrier supervision), and performed well in the interview according to Mullins.
Levine sued under Title VII for race discrimination; the district court found she made a prima facie case, that USPS proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, and granted summary judgment for USPS because Levine failed to show pretext.
The Sixth Circuit majority reversed, holding Levine produced enough comparative‑qualifications and other evidence to create a genuine issue of pretext; Judge Thapar dissented, arguing the majority misapplied Bender and substituted the court’s judgment for the employer’s.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prima facie disparate treatment	Levine: member of protected class, qualified, suffered adverse action, replaced by white	USPS: did not dispute first three elements; challenged fourth below but not on appeal	Court: Levine established prima facie; USPS does not contest on appeal
Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason	Levine: employer reasons (interview, experience) are subjective/overstated	USPS: selected Peare because of more relevant supervisory experience and superior interview	Court: USPS articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons; uncontested on appeal
Pretext (whether employer’s reasons were a mask for discrimination)	Levine: comparative evidence (education, awards, mystery‑shopper scores, asked to train Peare) makes USPS’s explanation unworthy of credence	USPS: Levine was at best "arguably" superior; Bender requires "plainly" superior; employer may prefer experience over education	Held: Majority — Levine produced sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment (case reversed and remanded). Dissent — would affirm under Bender and defer to employer’s judgment

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (announcing the burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment)
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (clarifies burdens under McDonnell Douglas)
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (comparative qualifications can create a triable issue of pretext even where superiority is "arguable")
Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2006) (where little other evidence of discrimination exists, plaintiff must be so significantly better qualified that no reasonable employer would choose the other)
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasonableness of employer’s decision may shed light on pretext)
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (if a reasonable employer would find plaintiff significantly better qualified, a factfinder may infer discrimination)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standard; draw inferences for nonmovant)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for summary judgment; scintilla of evidence insufficient)
Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2011) (distinguishable precedent addressing employer’s reliance on documented performance problems)