140 A.3d 1242
Me.2016Background
- Decedent Edward Grant worked at Bath Iron Works (BIW) in the 1960s–1970s; he performed cleaning and painting duties and died of asbestos-caused lung cancer in 2011.
- Plaintiffs (Patricia Grant and the Estate) sued multiple manufacturers/sellers, including New England Insulation Company (NEI), Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries, alleging negligence, defective/unreasonably dangerous goods (14 M.R.S. § 221), and loss of consortium.
- NEI sold Owens‑Corning Kaylo pipe covering to BIW in 1969; Foster Wheeler, Warren, and Imo supplied equipment (pumps, boilers, turbines) that had original gaskets/packing which may have contained asbestos.
- At summary judgment the defendants argued plaintiffs failed to prove product nexus or medical causation tying Grant’s asbestos exposure to any named defendant’s product.
- The Estate relied on Grant’s deposition (which recalled asbestos exposure while cleaning in 1966–67 but not clearly in 1969–70) and several coworker statements offering general, non‑specific recollections about cleaning and asbestos at BIW.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the four defendants; the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding the Estate’s evidence was speculative and insufficient to establish a prima facie causal link between Grant’s injury and those defendants’ products.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs produced admissible evidence establishing product nexus (that Grant was exposed to defendants’ specific asbestos‑containing products) | Estate argued coworker testimony and NEI sale records show defendants’ products were at BIW while Grant worked there, so he likely inhaled asbestos from those products | Defendants argued plaintiffs lacked evidence placing Grant in proximity to their specific products when asbestos was released; evidence was speculative | Held: Plaintiffs’ evidence was speculative; no admissible proof of exposure to those defendants’ products (summary judgment affirmed) |
| Whether plaintiffs proved medical causation (exposure to defendant products was a substantial factor in causing cancer) | Estate relied on established medical causation from asbestos exposure generally and argued product nexus evidence sufficed to link exposure to defendants | Defendants argued absence of product nexus prevents proving exposure from their products, so medical causation to those products cannot be shown | Held: Without product nexus, medical causation to these defendants’ products was not established; claim fails |
| Proper standard for asbestos product‑nexus at summary judgment (Lohrmann frequency/regularity test vs. less burdensome proximity test) | Estate contended lower (proximity) standard should apply and was met by their evidence | Defendants favored stricter Lohrmann standard requiring regular, proximate exposure to a specific product | Held: Court applied the less burdensome proximity test used below but found plaintiffs failed even under that standard; did not decide which test Maine should adopt |
| Whether failure‑to‑warn or seller liability under §221 survives absent causation | Estate argued duty to warn and seller liability persisted | Defendants argued duty/§221 claims require that the product caused injury; absent causation, those claims fail | Held: Duty‑to‑warn and §221 claims fail without proof defendants’ products caused Grant’s injury (loss of consortium also fails) |
Key Cases Cited
- Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 116 A.3d 466 (Me. 2015) (summary judgment review and viewing evidence in favor of nonmovant)
- Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 55 A.3d 484 (Me. 2012) (defendant moving for summary judgment must show plaintiff lacks prima facie case)
- Angell v. Hallee, 92 A.3d 1154 (Me. 2014) (definition of material fact and genuine issue at summary judgment)
- Crowe v. Shaw, 755 A.2d 509 (Me. 2000) (mere possibility is insufficient; speculation defeats causation at summary judgment)
- Mastriano v. Blyer, 779 A.2d 951 (Me. 2001) (elements of negligence include proximate causation)
- Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997) (in asbestos cases plaintiffs must prove both product nexus and medical causation)
- Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986) (frequency, regularity, and proximity test for inferring substantial causation)
- Welch v. Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (lesser standard: showing work with or in close proximity to defendant’s products can reach a jury)