Patricia Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department
130 A.3d 172
| R.I. | 2016Background
- Sixteen nonteaching school-department employees retired between 1999 and 2007 after ≥15 years’ service; each retired under a then-applicable collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) containing identical Article 19.5 describing retiree health coverage.
- Article 19.5 provided retirees age ≥58 with family Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Delta Dental coverage "until the Retired employee is eligible for coverage under Medicare." Article 19.5 did not mention retiree co-payments.
- Until August 2007 retirees paid no co-payments; an arbitrator in 2007 required active nonteaching employees to begin contributing co-payments in the 2007–2010 CBA (Article 19.10), and the school department thereafter billed retirees for co-payments.
- Plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory relief, breach of contract damages and reimbursement of co-payments paid since August 2007; the Superior Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, awarding damages and injunctive relief.
- The Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether Article 19.5 was ambiguous and whether summary judgment for plaintiffs was appropriate, vacating the Superior Court judgment and remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article 19.5 unambiguously entitles retirees to free health insurance (no co-payments) until Medicare eligibility | Article 19.5’s silence about co-payments means retirees were promised free coverage; past practice (no co-pay until 2007) supports this | Article 19.5 does not promise free coverage; retirees participate on same terms as active employees and silence does not preclude co-payments | Article 19.5 is ambiguous because it is reasonably susceptible to more than one rational interpretation |
| Whether interpretation of Article 19.5 is a question for the court on summary judgment | Plaintiffs: text and affidavits establish an unambiguous promise entitling them to judgment as a matter of law | Defendants: extrinsic evidence (practice and administrator affidavits) shows different intent, creating factual dispute | Because the term is ambiguous, intent is a factual question; extrinsic evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment |
| Whether plaintiffs proved breach of the CBAs as a matter of law | Plaintiffs: billing and payments after August 2007 breached the retiree-benefit promise | Defendants: billing aligned retirees’ obligations with terms imposed on active employees through arbitration | Held: Unresolved factual dispute on parties’ intent; claim of breach cannot be decided on summary judgment |
| Proper remedy at summary judgment stage | Plaintiffs sought reimbursement and injunctive relief now | Defendants opposed summary disposition | Held: Granting summary judgment for plaintiffs was improper; case remanded for further proceedings to resolve factual disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598 (R.I. 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Great American E & S Ins. Co. v. End Zone Pub. & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571 (R.I. 2012) (summary-judgment standards)
- JPL Livery Servs., Inc. v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Admin., 88 A.3d 1134 (R.I. 2014) (determination of contract ambiguity is a question of law)
- Miller v. Saunders, 80 A.3d 44 (R.I. 2013) (definition of contractual ambiguity)
- Inland Am. Retail Mgmt. LLC v. Cinemaworld of Fla., Inc., 68 A.3d 457 (R.I. 2013) (ambiguity converts interpretation into a factual question)
- Plainfield Pike Gas & Convenience, LLC v. 1889 Plainfield Pike Realty Corp., 994 A.2d 54 (R.I. 2010) (affidavits creating factual dispute defeat summary judgment)
- Garden City Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Coordinated Health Partners, Inc., 852 A.2d 535 (R.I. 2004) (courts should not read ambiguity into plain contracts)