PATRICIA ASH v. IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF AARON ASH, 21-0700

Aaron Ash, born 1972, is permanently physically and mentally disabled; his father Hyman was appointed plenary guardian in 1992.
In Dec. 2019 Hyman told Aaron’s mother, Patricia, he wanted her to succeed him; Patricia filed a Verified Petition for Successor Guardian (Feb. 2020).
Judge Colodny held a non-adversary hearing, authorized Patricia to obtain Aaron’s financial information and to secure a Miami‑Dade residence for Aaron, and required Patricia to complete transition steps before appointment.
Patricia met with the bank, accounting staff, prepared a Transition Plan, and executed a Memorandum of Understanding with long‑time caregiver Nelson to continue Aaron’s care in Nelson’s home.
After Colodny recused, Hyman reversed and objected before a successor judge, claiming he did not know Patricia intended to live separately from Aaron; the successor judge denied Patricia’s petition adopting Hyman’s proposed order.
The appellate court reversed, concluding the probate court abused its discretion by allowing Hyman to change positions (equitable estoppel) and by failing to consider Aaron’s best interests.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hyman is estopped from opposing Patricia’s appointment after his prior agreement	Patricia: Hyman previously agreed to the transition and conditioned it on steps she completed; she relied on that and court authorization	Hyman: He never knew Patricia would live separately; Patricia’s preparations were undertaken at her own risk	Court: Reversed — Hyman is estopped from reversing his prior position; trial court abused discretion
Whether the probate court properly considered the ward’s best interests	Patricia: Court failed to consider Aaron’s best interests despite evidence (Nelson’s long‑time caregiving, housing/accessibility issues, financial mismanagement)	Hyman/Trial court: Focused on his changed objection and found lack of detrimental reliance	Court: Reversed — probate court erred by not analyzing ward’s best interests; remand for further proceedings

Carvell v. Kinsey, 87 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1956) (admissions in pleadings accepted as facts)
Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 237 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (litigants may not take inconsistent positions)
United Contractors, Inc. v. United Const. Corp., 187 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (equitable estoppel requires consistency and reliance)
LPI/Key West Assocs., Ltd v. Beachcomber Jewelers, Inc., 77 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (pretrial stipulations binding)
Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2006) (ward’s best interests are the polestar in guardianship)
In re Guardianship of Stephens, 965 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (best‑interest standard in guardianships)
Romano v. Olshen, 153 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (guardianship courts are courts of equity)
Sun Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 645 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (courts must scrupulously oversee affairs of incompetent persons)