349 Ga. App. 892
Ga. Ct. App.2019Background
- On April 14, 2016, Yim (age 28) collided with Carr while driving a 2014 Hyundai Sonata she co-owned with her mother; the insurance policy was in the parents’ names.
- Yim lived with her parents, paid loan payments (via giving money to her father), reimbursed insurance premiums, and paid gasoline and maintenance; she had sole possession of the keys and was the only driver.
- Carr sued Yim for negligence and sued Yim’s parents for vicarious liability (family purpose doctrine and respondeat superior); negligent entrustment was later dismissed.
- Yim moved to enforce a pre-suit settlement offer sent by Carr to Liberty Mutual (policy limit $100,000) after Liberty Mutual sent a response letter stating it accepted and sent payment but raised concerns about the scope of the limited release (suggesting the insurer’s named insureds be included).
- The trial court enforced the alleged settlement and denied the parents’ summary judgment motions; the Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review and consolidated the cross-appeal.
- The Court of Appeals reversed both rulings: (1) parents entitled to summary judgment because no authority/control or employment connection supported vicarious liability; (2) no binding settlement because Liberty Mutual did not unequivocally accept the essential term that only Yim be released.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carr) | Defendant's Argument (Parents/Liberty Mutual) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of family purpose doctrine | Parents exercised authority/control over vehicle (title, insurance) so vicarious liability applies | Parents lacked authority/control; Yim paid expenses, had sole possession and permission to use car | Reversed trial court; family purpose doctrine inapplicable—no authority/control established |
| Respondeat superior (vicarious liability as employer) | Yim worked for father and was in area of job; parents could be liable as employer | Yim was on personal volunteer errand at time of crash; not acting within scope of employment | Reversed trial court; no evidence Yim was acting within course and scope of employment |
| Enforceability of pre-suit settlement under OCGA §9-11-67.1 | Liberty Mutual accepted Carr’s pre-suit offer (Response Letter said "acceptance without condition") and sent policy limits | Response Letter did not accept essential term (that only Yim be released); it sought inclusion/negotiation about other insureds, so no unequivocal acceptance | Reversed trial court; no meeting of the minds—no binding settlement because acceptance was not unequivocal |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. Butler, 199 Ga. App. 753 (distinguishing family purpose where sole driver paid expenses)
- Walston v. White, 213 Ga. App. 441 (agency, not title, is the test for family purpose)
- Dashtpeyma v. Wade, 285 Ga. App. 361 (outlining family purpose two-step test)
- Duenas v. Cook, 347 Ga. App. 436 (settlement-offer material terms under OCGA § 9-11-67.1)
- Penn v. Muktar, 309 Ga. App. 849 (no meeting of minds where insurer would not agree to limited bodily-injury release)
- Kitchens v. Ezell, 315 Ga. App. 444 (no binding settlement when insurer’s proposed release broadened essential terms)
- Anderson v. Benton, 295 Ga. App. 851 (no settlement where offer limited parties/claims released but insurer demanded broader release)
- McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850 (clarifying that unresolved essential terms prevent formation of contract)