Patric Patterson v. Kennie Bolden, 902 F.3d 845

Background

Patterson, an Arkansas inmate, was brutally beaten in an open barracks by another inmate; he suffered severe injuries including the loss of an eye and multiple surgeries.
Night duty officer Mazzanti was assigned to monitor two 54‑bed barracks via thirty‑minute visual checks from a control booth or hallway; defendants say checks were made, Patterson and others dispute full visibility and regularity of checks.
Patterson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting Eighth Amendment failure‑to‑protect claims against Mazzanti, the ADC director, and other Varner Unit officials, alleging understaffing and inadequate supervision/policies.
The magistrate judge and district court denied Patterson’s requests for appointed counsel, then adopted a report recommending summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds; Patterson appealed both rulings.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of appointed counsel (abuse‑of‑discretion standard) and affirmed summary judgment, holding Patterson failed to show subjective deliberate indifference by officials to a specific or general risk.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court abused discretion in denying appointed counsel	Patterson argued case complexity and inability to conduct discovery warranted counsel	Defendants argued plaintiff litigated capably pro se; court has discretion	Denied: court did not abuse discretion given plaintiff's demonstrated competence
Whether defendants violated Eighth Amendment re: specific, unforeseen attack	Patterson contends Mazzanti was inattentive and absent, enabling the attack	Defendants argue attack was a surprise; plaintiff admitted he did not know Mazzanti’s movements	Held for defendants: surprise attack and plaintiff’s lack of knowledge defeat specific‑threat claim
Whether open‑barracks policy/staffing amounted to a per se constitutional violation	Patterson argues understaffing and policy created pervasive risk	Defendants argue policy and staffing did not show subjective knowledge of risk; Smith is limited	Held for defendants: Smith limited to different remedial context; no per se violation established
Whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to a general, known risk	Patterson points to prior violence, falsified logs, limited visibility, and policy prohibiting solo entry as evidence of obvious risk and awareness	Defendants point to records of regular checks, lack of reports of prior incidents to ADC, and no direct evidence officials knew of pervasive risk	Held for defendants: record lacked evidence that officials were subjectively aware of a substantial, known risk — qualified immunity applies

Key Cases Cited

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard; knowledge of substantial risk)
Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2002) (gross negligence insufficient for Eighth Amendment failure‑to‑protect)
Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 103 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 1996) (open barracks hazards discussed; limited to specific remedial context)
Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2002) (denial of qualified immunity where evidence showed longstanding, documented staffing risks)
Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1986) (factors for appointing counsel in civil cases)