Paterek v. Village of Armada, Michigan
801 F.3d 630
6th Cir.2015Background
- John and Cynthia Paterek and their company (PME) operated injection-molding businesses under Special Approval Land Use permits (SALUs) in the Village of Armada; SALUs contained conditions (e.g., limitations on outside storage, hours, employee count).
- Longstanding disputes between PME (and John Paterek as a public figure) and Commissioner Ben Delecke escalated after the Patereks successfully appealed Planning Commission limits in 1995; Plaintiffs allege Delecke thereafter harassed and retaliated against them.
- From 2011–2013, conflicts included threats to remove Paterek from the Downtown Development Authority (DDA), repeated enforcement actions for alleged SALU violations (outside storage, a barbeque grill), and many municipal tickets and threatened prosecutions.
- In 2013 PME expanded into a neighboring workshop; the Village demanded a new Certificate of Occupancy (COO) and issued daily fines despite evidence that the preexisting SALU ran with the land; the district court enjoined further tickets and ordered inspections and issuance of COOs consistent with existing SALUs.
- The Village later issued a COO for the workshop that imposed strict operating-hour limits contrary to the SALU; Plaintiffs moved for civil and criminal contempt and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Amendment retaliation, substantive and procedural due process, equal protection) and under FOIA.
- The district court denied the contempt motions and granted summary judgment to Defendants on the constitutional claims (but Plaintiffs won the FOIA claim). Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Civil contempt — did Village violate court order by issuing COO with new time restriction and delay apartment inspection? | Paterek: Village violated the November 27, 2013 order requiring a COO "in conformance with the existing SALU"; the imposed hours conflicted with SALU and thus breached the order; contempt relief appropriate. | Village/District Ct: Order was not sufficiently specific about COO conditions or inspection timing; no clear, definite violation proven. | Court of Appeals: Vacated denial of civil contempt as erroneous for failing to find Village violated clear order by issuing a COO inconsistent with the SALU; remanded. District court did not abuse discretion re: apartment-inspection timing. |
| 2) First Amendment retaliation — was enforcement motivated by Paterek's protected speech? | Paterek: Repeated adverse actions (tickets, prosecutions, loss of DDA chair) were motivated by retaliation for past protected speech and escalating animus by Delecke. | Defendants: Temporal gaps and legitimate enforcement actions negate causation/motive. | Court of Appeals: Reversed summary judgment — genuine issues of material fact exist (timing, disparate treatment, Council letter, Delecke's statements) sufficient to let jury decide causation/motive. |
| 3) Substantive due process — were enforcement and permitting actions arbitrary and capricious? | Paterek: SALU and COO entitlements created protected property interests; Village acted arbitrarily (selective enforcement, insistence on new SALU/COO, unilateral hour restrictions). | Defendants: No cognizable deprivation; prosecutions dismissed and no permanent loss of rights. | Court of Appeals: Reversed summary judgment — disputed facts (disparate treatment, odd permit handling, COO terms) could support arbitrary-and-capricious finding. |
| 4) Equal protection (class-of-one) — was PME treated differently without rational basis? | Paterek: Other local businesses received COO leniency or were not ticketed; Delecke admitted personality conflict; disparate treatment indicates animus/no rational basis. | Defendants: Actions were lawful and not targeted; differences explained by legitimate reasons. | Court of Appeals: Reversed summary judgment — factual disputes (comparators and admitted animus) preclude resolving claim at summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard) (establishes that nonmoving party must present more than a scintilla to avoid summary judgment)
- Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability) (municipalities liable when unconstitutional action stems from policy, custom, or authorized decisionmaker)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity) (two-step inquiry on constitutional violation and whether right was clearly established)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (clearly established law) (courts must avoid defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. en banc) (First Amendment retaliation elements and standards)
- Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697 (substantive due process) (zoning actions arbitrary and capricious can implicate substantive due process)
- Colling v. Barry, 841 F.2d 1297 (civil contempt remedy) (civil contempt intended to remedy deprivation or loss)
