Pasic v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation
219 N.E.3d 669
Ill. App. Ct.2022Background:
- Josip Pasic, a long‑time Illinois psychiatrist, accepted a consent order imposing an indefinite suspension of his medical license with a minimum two‑year term; he did not admit the underlying allegations.
- After serving the minimum suspension, Pasic petitioned in May 2019 to restore his license; an ALJ hearing admitted testimony and documentary evidence in support of restoration.
- The ALJ sua sponte raised the issue of clinical competency under 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1285.130(c) (a rule addressing expired/inactive licenses >3 years) even though neither party had argued it at the hearing.
- The ALJ, Disciplinary Board, and Director concluded Pasic failed to show sufficient rehabilitation and treated noncompliance with section 1285.130 as a basis for denial.
- The Department later acknowledged its current two‑step practice: (1) restoration upon showing rehabilitation, and (2) if the physician had not practiced >3 years, requiring compliance with 1285.130 to reactivate an inactive license; it conceded 1285.130 is not properly applied at the first step.
- The appellate court held the Department’s consideration of 1285.130 at the rehabilitation stage was erroneous and prejudicial, violated due process, reversed the administrative decision, and remanded for a new hearing.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether treating the underlying disciplinary allegations (resolved by consent order without admission) as evidence denied due process | Pasic: consent order did not admit allegations; he should not be prejudiced by unproven misconduct | Dept: consent order permitted findings after hearing; considering seriousness of offense is proper | Court held no due process violation on this point; consent order allowed consideration of the allegations in assessing seriousness |
| Whether applying 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1285.130(c) (clinical competency for expired/inactive >3 years) in a restoration‑from‑suspension hearing violated due process | Pasic: 1285.130 applies only to expired/inactive licenses >3 years and is not relevant at the rehabilitation step; raising it sua sponte prejudiced him | Dept: initially asserted 1285.130 applied; later conceded its current practice separates rehabilitation and competency; argued competency was an ancillary concern and denial was for insufficient rehabilitation | Court held consideration of 1285.130 at the restoration stage was erroneous and substantial, deprived Pasic of due process, and warranted a new administrative hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Du Page County Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 358 Ill. App. 3d 476 (2005) (review of agency decisions focuses on agency record)
- Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247 (1995) (questions of law reviewed de novo)
- Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008) (findings of fact are prima facie true and correct)
- Des Plaines Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Knight, 29 Ill. 2d 244 (1963) (administrative decisions must be based on hearing evidence and not extraneous considerations)
- Brummet v. Farel, 217 Ill. App. 3d 264 (1991) (distinction and effect of judicial/evidentiary admissions)
- Keener v. City of Herrin, 235 Ill. 2d 338 (2009) (court may strike or disregard noncompliant brief material)
- Marozas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the City of Burbank, 222 Ill. App. 3d 781 (1991) (reviewing court must ensure due process and impartial adjudication in administrative hearings)