Partlow v. Person
798 F. Supp. 2d 878
E.D. Mich.2011Background
- Plaintiff, personal representative of the decedent's estate, seeks to recover life-insurance proceeds from Met Life after a divorce waiver allegedly extinguished defendant's rights.
- Decedent Farrell Partlow was insured under a GM life-insurance plan administered by Met Life; Julie Ann Person was named as the primary beneficiary prior to divorce.
- The May 30, 2003 consent judgment of divorce contained an insurance waiver clause extinguishing rights to policy proceeds unless provided otherwise in the judgment.
- Decedent never updated his beneficiary designation to reflect the divorce; Met Life paid the proceeds to the defendant after the death in 2010.
- Plaintiff filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court (state court) seeking to impose a remedy against the defendant, claiming waivers and state-law equitable relief; defendant removed to federal court asserting ERISA preemption.
- The federal court granted remand, finding the complaint not completely preempted by ERISA and lacking federal-question jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the claim is completely preempted by ERISA | Partlow argues the state-law claim is not completely preempted and can remain in state court. | Person contends ERISA complete preemption applies because the dispute concerns benefits under an ERISA plan. | Not completely preempted; ERISA does not convert the state-law claim into a federal enforcement action. |
| Whether federal jurisdiction exists under the well-pleaded complaint rule | Complaint does not facially allege ERISA-based relief; no federal question stated. | Removal based on ERISA preemption provides federal jurisdiction. | No original jurisdiction; state-court claim lacks federal question jurisdiction. |
| Whether removal was proper given the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction | Remand should return case to state court due to lack of federal jurisdiction. | Removal was proper under complete preemption theory. | Remand warranted; lack of subject-matter jurisdiction requires remand. |
| Whether plaintiff is entitled to costs or attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) | Plaintiff seeks costs and fees for wrongful removal. | Removal was reasonably grounded in a plausible misreading of the complaint. | Fees and costs denied; removal had objective basis and was reasonably supportable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (ERISA preemption in divorce-related beneficiary designation)
- Loftis v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 342 F.3d 509 (6th Cir.2003) (complete preemption doctrine in ERISA context)
- Michalec v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (ERISA complete preemption limited to § 1132(a)(1)(B))
- Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531 (6th Cir.1995) (complete preemption under ERISA; preemption doctrine)
- Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 456 (6th Cir.2002) (interpretation of ERISA preemption scope)
- Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (intertwined state-law enforcement with ERISA plan; complete preemption)
- Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Howell, 227 F.3d 672 (6th Cir.2000) (distinction after ERISA-does-not-preempt-distribution of plan proceeds)
- Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) (discusses waiver effects in ERISA context)
- Wright v. Gen. Motors Corp., 262 F.3d 610 (6th Cir.2001) (principles on ERISA preemption and removability)