2016 Ohio 4894
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Plaintiff Dennis Partin, a machinist, lost the tip of his right thumb while assisting an operator at a Verson 400-ton press during a two-person Hobart blade production run.
- Partin alleged St. Mary’s had removed or bypassed safety devices: (1) metal mesh barrier gates previously installed around the press, and (2) the rear (left) set of dual palm-actuation controls (or its effective use) via a key selector and short cord, so helpers could not reach them.
- Partin sued under R.C. 2745.01 (statutory employer intentional tort) and under the common-law Fyffe standard (substantial-certainty intentional tort). He invoked the statutory rebuttable presumption where an employer deliberately removes an "equipment safety guard."
- St. Mary’s moved for summary judgment arguing the mesh gates were not "equipment safety guards," both palm-button sets remained physically present and operable, the key switch and short cord did not amount to deliberate removal, and no evidence supported substantial certainty of harm.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for St. Mary’s. The court found the dual palm buttons were "equipment safety guards" but were not deliberately removed; the mesh gates were not equipment safety guards; and Partin offered insufficient evidence to satisfy Fyffe’s substantial-certainty prong.
- The Second District affirmed, applying Ohio Supreme Court definitions and emphasizing the lack of evidence that the employer consciously eliminated or disabled the safety devices or that prior incidents made injury substantially certain.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mesh barrier gates were "equipment safety guards" under R.C. 2745.01(C) | Gates were installed to block access to the rear of the press and thus shielded workers from the dangerous point of operation. | Gates were aftermarket, freestanding pedestrian barriers not part of original press design and they prevented the press from being operated as the manufacturer intended. | Gates were not "equipment safety guards." Summary judgment for defendant. |
| Whether dual palm controls and key selector are "equipment safety guards" | Dual palm controls function to shield hands; key/set-up effectively disabled the rear control and thus removed a guard. | Dual palm controls are guards but remained physically present and operable; no evidence defendant deliberately removed or disabled them. | Dual palm controls are "equipment safety guards," but there was no deliberate removal shown; summary judgment for defendant. |
| Whether employer "deliberately removed" a guard (triggering R.C. 2745.01(C) presumption) | Turning key to ‘‘right only’’ and leaving the rear control cord too short effectively disabled/removed the guard; prior owner’s gates were ordered removed by White. | No conscious act to lift, push aside, take off or eliminate guards; components remained available; failure to lengthen cord or failing to compel a key setting is not "deliberate removal." | No deliberate removal: mere setting of key, short cord, or failure to instruct does not establish the statutory "deliberate removal." |
| Whether Partin proved common-law intentional tort under Fyffe (substantial certainty) | White knew hazards, had engineering background, was warned about guards and still assigned helper work requiring reaching into point of operation — harm was substantially certain. | This was an accident; no prior similar injuries; lack of proof employer knew injury was substantially certain. | Partin failed to show the requisite substantial certainty; summary judgment for defendant. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoyle v. DTJ Enterprises, Inc., 143 Ohio St.3d 197 (statutory presumption and requirments under R.C. 2745.01)
- Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 199 (definition of "deliberate removal" and "equipment safety guard")
- Pixley v. Pro-Pak Industries, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 203 (examples of bypassing as "deliberate removal")
- Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 115 (common-law employer intentional tort test: knowledge, substantial certainty, and forcing employee to continue)
- Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100 (contrast of negligence/recklessness with substantial certainty standard)