PARSONS VS. COLT'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LLC (NRAP 5)
2021 NV 72
| Nev. | 2021Background
- October 1, 2017 Route 91 mass shooting: shooter fired >1,000 rounds from a hotel room using AR‑15–style rifles equipped with bump stocks, killing 58 (including Carrie Parsons) and injuring many.
- James and Ann‑Marie Parsons (parents) sued multiple firearm manufacturers/distributors in Nevada state court for wrongful death, negligence per se (alleging violations of federal and Nevada machine‑gun statutes) and negligent entrustment.
- Defendants removed to federal court and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), invoking federal PLCAA and Nevada statutory immunity, NRS 41.131; the federal court dismissed negligent entrustment and negligence per se but allowed wrongful‑death claims to proceed under a PLCAA predicate‑exception theory and certified state‑law questions to the Nevada Supreme Court.
- The federal court assumed (for certification) the complaint plausibly alleged that the AR‑15s could be converted into machineguns in violation of federal and state prohibitions.
- Nevada Supreme Court construed NRS 41.131 (enacted 1985) — which declares that no person has a cause of action against a firearm manufacturer/distributor "merely because the firearm or ammunition was capable of causing serious injury..." and states the provision is "declaratory and not in derogation of the common law" — and answered the certified questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Parsons) | Defendant's Argument (Gun companies) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a wrongful‑death claim premised on allegations that manufacturers/dealers knowingly violated federal/state machine‑gun prohibitions falls outside NRS 41.131 immunity | NRS 41.131 immunizes only liability based on the firearm’s inherent dangerousness ("merely because"); here Plaintiffs allege illegal manufacture/distribution, not mere inherent danger, so claims should survive | NRS 41.131 broadly immunizes manufacturers/distributors from civil claims involving any firearm or ammunition, regardless of legality; only design/production defect suits remain excepted | Held: NRS 41.131 bars the wrongful‑death claims here; the statute covers "any firearm or ammunition," and does not limit immunity to lawful firearms; alleged illegality does not overcome immunity |
| Whether the statute’s second sentence ("declaratory and not in derogation of the common law") means NRS 41.131 cannot bar claims that allege illegal conduct (i.e., it is merely declaratory) | "Declaratory" means the statute only restates common law and should not be read to protect unlawful conduct; thus a claim alleging illegal manufacture/distribution remains viable | "Declaratory" is an interpretive direction to construe the statute consistent with common‑law principles; it does not imply the Legislature intended to exclude illegal firearms from the statute’s sweep | Held: The declaratory clause guides interpretation but does not limit the statute to lawful firearms; courts should follow common‑law rules (which favor leaving creation of new civil liabilities to the Legislature), so immunity applies |
| Whether negligence‑per‑se claims predicated on criminal machine‑gun statutes can proceed absent clear legislative intent to create civil liability | Plaintiffs: violation of criminal statutes may establish negligence per se; legislative intent is not a strict prerequisite | Defendants: permitting negligence per se based on criminal statutes would undermine NRS 41.131 immunity; legislative intent to create civil remedies is required | Held: Nevada Supreme Court did not decide this question—resolution unnecessary because NRS 41.131 provides dispositive immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99 (Nev. 1969) (courts should defer to the Legislature before imposing new common‑law liabilities tied to sensitive public policy)
- Progressive Gulf Ins. Co. v. Faehnrich, 130 Nev. 167 (Nev. 2014) (standards for answering certified questions under NRAP 5)
- Thomas v. Bokelman, 86 Nev. 10 (Nev. 1970) (third‑party criminal act as superseding cause; no common‑law manufacturer liability for third‑party misuse)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (U.S. 1994) (statutory definitions and mens rea discussion relevant to whether semiautomatic/AR‑15 variants qualify as machineguns)