Parson v. State of Florida, 1D2023-0869

Background

Michael Parson entered a plea agreement with the State of Florida, pleading no contest to traveling to meet a minor, with a provision for 10 years of sex-offender probation and a handwritten notation for “EARLY TERM AT 5 YEARS.”
At the plea colloquy, Parson acknowledged that early termination after five years was subject to him completing all conditions and court approval.
The sentencing judge accepted the plea but did not include the early termination provision in the probation order; Parson did not object at the time or seek to correct the omission.
After serving more than six years of probation without violation, Parson requested early termination, noting his full compliance and the State's lack of objection; the trial court denied his requests without substantive explanation.
Parson petitioned for writ of certiorari, seeking appellate review of the denial based on the plea agreement provision; the appellate court issued an interim writ mandating the trial court to explain its decision, which was subsequently based on the seriousness of the offense and community interests.
The appellate majority dismissed the petition for lack of certiorari jurisdiction and held that plea agreements cannot bind a court to early termination provisions, despite a dissent arguing for their enforceability once accepted by a sentencing judge.

Issues

Issue	Parson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Is the trial court bound by a plea agreement’s early termination provision?	The plea agreement, accepted by the court, binds the court to terminate probation at 5 years upon Parson’s compliance.	The court is never bound by the plea agreement’s terms, even if accepted; early termination remains discretionary.	The court is not bound by the plea agreement; discretion over early termination remains with the court.
Did Parson suffer a cognizable harm justifying certiorari relief?	Parson’s right to early termination was denied despite full compliance, constituting enforceable harm.	No cognizable harm exists because the court’s discretion was never contractually limited by the plea agreement.	No cognizable harm exists; certiorari jurisdiction not triggered.
Does the probation order’s omission of early termination matter if the plea agreement provided it?	Oral pronouncement and plea agreement terms should control over the written order.	Without the term in the written order, the sentence imposed is what controls; agreement alone is insufficient.	The written probation order controls; omission of early termination provision is dispositive.
Can appellate courts compel enforcement of plea agreements against trial courts?	Yes, accepted plea bargains are enforceable, and specific performance is required when the defendant complies.	No, courts cannot be bound by plea agreements; only the State and defendant are parties to the agreement.	No appellate jurisdiction; plea agreements are not enforceable against courts.

Key Cases Cited

Tilghman v. Culver, 99 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1957) (courts cannot bind themselves to plea agreements)
Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975) (trial courts are never bound by plea agreements in sentencing)
Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1996) (written or oral plea agreements are not binding on courts)
McCoy v. State, 599 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1992) (addressing State’s obligation under accepted plea agreements)
Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003) (oral pronouncement of sentence controls; double jeopardy concerns)
Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1979) (plea agreements are contractual and mutually binding with enforcement principles)