822 S.E.2d 169
Va.2018Background
- Decedent Kenneth Coffey (age ~80) executed a will on July 15, 2013 leaving his residuary estate to his niece Vickie Parson and appointing her executor; he died July 22, 2013.
- Coffey had previously told his daughter Deneen Miller he intended to leave his property to her; Miller lived ~125 miles away and did not move in to care for him in his final months.
- In June–July 2013 Coffey became ill, received hospice care, and Parson (neighbor/niece) acted as primary caregiver; Coffey authorized Parson to buy a will kit but Parson did not draft or attend the signing.
- Miller sued to impeach the 2013 will for lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; the trial court struck the capacity claim but let undue influence go to the jury after finding Miller met the three-element presumption test.
- The jury found for Miller on undue influence; the trial court denied Parson’s motions to strike and to set aside the verdict, but the trial judge expressed reservations about the sufficiency of Miller’s evidence.
- On appeal the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether (1) the presumption was properly applied and (2) Miller presented clear and convincing evidence that Parson overbore Coffey’s will, or whether Parson’s evidence rebutted the presumption such that the motion to strike should have been granted.
Issues
| Issue | Miller's Argument | Parson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the three facts (age, beneficiary in position of confidence, prior contrary expression) gave rise to a presumption of undue influence | Yes; those elements were present so presumption arose | Agreed elements arose but argued she produced rebuttal evidence so presumption should not have been given effect | Court: Presumption arose (Virginia follows this three-element test) but is the Thayer-type (shifts only burden of production) |
| Effect of the presumption — does it shift burden of persuasion? | Miller relied on the presumption to submit the case to the jury | Parson argued presumption only shifts production; she produced evidence rebutting it so burden of persuasion stayed with Miller | Court: Presumption is Thayer-type; it shifts only burden of production, not persuasion; ultimate burden always remains with contestant (Miller) to prove undue influence by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether Parson’s evidence rebutted the presumption so that the presumption "disappeared" and the jury should not have been instructed on it | Miller argued credibility and lack of direct rebuttal meant jury could infer undue influence | Parson presented witnesses (attesting Coffey was decisive, lucid, in control at signing; caregiver conduct appropriate; witness to the signing) and argued those were adequate rebuttal | Held: Parson’s evidence countervailed the presumption; it disappeared. Miller failed to prove undue influence by clear and convincing evidence; trial court should have granted motion to strike and not submitted undue-influence question to jury |
| Whether trial court erred in denying motion to strike / entering judgment for Parson | Miller contended evidence was sufficient for jury | Parson asserted no evidence showed Coffey’s free will was destroyed and legal standard required clear and convincing proof | Held: Court reversed — evidence insufficient as matter of law; motion to strike should have been granted; judgment reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Weedon v. Weedon, 283 Va. 241 (2012) (undue influence must destroy testator’s free will; contestant bears burden of proving undue influence by clear and convincing evidence)
- Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523 (1988) (presumption of undue influence shifts burden of production only; burden of persuasion remains with contestant)
- Culpepper v. Robie, 155 Va. 64 (1930) (discussing circumstances that may give rise to an inference/presumption of undue influence)
- Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Daniel, 209 Va. 332 (1969) (discussion on effect of presumptions and jury instruction when a presumption is rebutted)
- Wilroy v. Halbleib, 214 Va. 442 (1974) (to submit undue influence to jury, evidence must show deprivation of volition; manifest irresistible coercion required)
- Pace v. Richmond, 231 Va. 216 (1986) (trial court must determine at threshold whether evidence tending to show undue influence is sufficiently probative to send to jury)