Parris v. LIMES
2012 OK 18
| Okla. | 2012Background
- Parris asserted medical malpractice against multiple providers involved in prostate cancer diagnosis, surgery, and post-surgical treatment; trials favored defendants, overturned on appeal in Parris I; on remand, pathologist trial resulted in defense verdict, others granted summary judgments based on adherence to standards; court held summary judgment appropriate for most claims but not for Dr. Barnes' informed consent claim; issue arose whether failure to disclose no-cancer findings before post-surgical treatment breached informed consent.
- Biopsy and pathology: biopsy labeled and performed properly by Dr. Limes; pre-surgical diagnosis supported, and there was no evidence of negligence by the pre-surgical pathologist Brinkworth; post-surgical management by Barnes was deemed appropriate based on pre-surgical PSA and literature; record contained undisputed expert testimony supporting standard care.
- Plaintiff argued Barnes concealed post-surgery pathology showing no cancer and continued treatment; trial court treated concealment as fraud but the appellate court found it viable as an informed consent theory.
- Informed consent theory: Oklahoma law requires disclosure of material information to enable intelligent consent; duty to inform is personal to physician; breach occurs if information necessary for informed choice is withheld; causation hinges on whether plaintiff would have refused treatment if adequately informed; damages include treatment costs, travel, and time.
- Remand instructions: if consent was not given due to nondisclosure, jurors must assess credibility of plaintiff’s claim, determine causation, and award damages including travel and time.
- Outcome: summary judgment affirmed for most malpractice claims and for Barnes on concealment fraud theory; but remanded for trial on Barnes’ duty to inform (informed consent) and related damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was a triable claim for informed consent breach. | Parris maintained Barnes concealed no-cancer findings, breaching informed consent. | Barnes argues there was proper disclosure or lack of evidence of concealment on summary judgment. | Remand for trial on informed-consent claim; not precluded. |
| Whether summary judgment on concealment was proper as a fraud claim. | Concealment supported fraud theory. | Record supported fraud-based dismissal. | Summary judgment affirmed for concealment as fraud; but not for informed consent theory. |
| Whether causation can be proved without expert testimony. | Plaintiff’s testimony suffices to prove would not have consented. | Credibility of plaintiff’s testimony must be assessed by jury. | Jury to assess credibility; expert testimony not required for informed-consent claim. |
| What damages are recoverable for informed-consent breach. | Damages include treatment costs, travel, and time. | Damages limited by standard negligence measures. | Damages include all reasonable costs, travel, and time related to treatment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Scott v. Bradford, 1979 OK 165, 606 P.2d 554 (OK 1979) (duty to inform; informed consent essential; patient autonomy)
- Hadnot v. Shaw, 1992 OK 21, 826 P.2d 978 (OK 1992) (summary judgment scope; fair liability theories within evidentiary record)
- Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. App. 2d 1957) (basis for physician's duty to disclose information)
- Canterbury v. Spence, (D.C. Cir. 1972) (D.C. Cir. 1972) (standard for disclosure is conduct reasonable under circumstances)
- Smith v. Reisig, 1984 OK 56, 686 P.2d 285 (OK 1984) (elements of informed-consent claim; causation and injury)