Parra v. Jackson
171 N.E.3d 452
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- On August 28, 2019 Antonio Parra was fatally shot; witnesses reported the fleeing car was registered to Frank Q. Jackson, a grandson of Cleveland Mayor Frank G. Jackson.
- Andrea Parra sued Mayor Jackson and Cleveland Police Chief Calvin D. Williams in both official and personal capacities, alleging wrongful death (against the mayor), and intentional infliction of emotional distress and obstruction of justice (against both).
- Complaint alleges police deviations from policy at the mayor’s residence (no questioning of the grandson, no gunshot-residue test, body cameras not used) and a broader pattern of obstruction and a “culture of impunity” protecting the mayor’s relatives.
- Plaintiff did not oppose dismissal of claims against Williams in his official capacity; the trial court granted official-capacity dismissal but denied Williams’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the personal-capacity claims based on R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity.
- The appeal presented was limited to whether the complaint pleaded facts sufficient to defeat statutory immunity for a public employee under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton/reckless conduct) at the pleading stage.
- The appellate court affirmed the trial court: under notice pleading the complaint plausibly alleged exceptions to immunity and dismissal would be premature.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) immunity is defeated by the complaint’s allegations | Parra: complaint alleges deliberate obstruction of the investigation, deviations from policy, failure to test/question, refusal to use body cams, and refusal to appoint independent investigator — supporting malice/bad faith/wanton or reckless conduct | Williams: allegations are conclusory or limited (only refusal to appoint independent investigator); he lacked duty/authority to appoint; allegations do not show malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness | Court: Complaint sufficiently alleges facts that, if proven, could fall within the statutory exceptions; denial of 12(B)(6) affirmed (dismissal premature) |
| Whether plaintiff must plead malice/bad faith/wantonness with particularity | Parra: general averments of state of mind are permissible under Civ.R. 9 and notice pleading; details often in defendant’s possession | Williams: claims lack particularized factual specificity to overcome immunity | Court: No heightened pleading required for immunity exceptions; state of mind may be averred generally and plaintiff need not disprove immunity at pleading stage |
| Whether Williams’s alleged failure to appoint an independent investigator is insufficient standing alone | Parra: failure to appoint was one of several pleaded acts within a broader pattern of obstruction and deviations attributable to the police chief | Williams: refusal to appoint, even if true, does not show the statutory mental-state exceptions or any legal duty | Court: The allegation is part of broader factual allegations; viewed under notice pleading, it contributes to a plausible claim that falls within the exceptions |
| Whether the obstruction/IIED claims depend on proving identity of the shooters | Parra: IIED and obstruction claims focus on the alleged cover-up and departmental conduct, not solely on who committed the murder | Williams: plaintiff’s theory rests on speculation about the mayor’s grandsons’ involvement, so allegations are too speculative | Court: IIED and obstruction claims are independent of the identity of the perpetrators; speculative identity does not defeat the pleaded immunity exceptions |
Key Cases Cited
- Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231 (2010) (explains R.C. Chapter 2744 framework for political-subdivision immunity analysis)
- Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79 (2004) (standard of review for Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is de novo)
- York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143 (1991) (notice pleading — plaintiff not required to prove case at pleading stage)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (2012) (definitions of wanton and reckless conduct under Ohio law)
- Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349 (2016) (distinguishes employee immunity question from merits of plaintiff’s claims)
- Jackson v. Butler County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 76 Ohio App.3d 448 (1991) (definition of malice as used in immunity context)
- Bush v. Kelleys, Inc., 18 Ohio St.2d 89 (1969) (definition of malice as willful and intentional design to do injury)