443 P.3d 834
Wyo.2019Background
- In 1978 Parkhurst was convicted of first-degree murder and assault with felonious intent after a home invasion in which a shotgun linked to his vehicle was fired and witnesses identified Parkhurst at the scene; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Parkhurst pursued multiple post-conviction and federal habeas challenges over the years, raising ineffective-assistance and other constitutional claims; none succeeded.
- In 2016 he filed a Rule 35(a) motion alleging ineffective assistance; the district court denied it as untimely and barred by res judicata.
- In 2018 Parkhurst filed a petition under Wyoming’s newly enacted Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, asserting ineffective assistance, a conflict of counsel, and missing trial transcripts, and arguing the new Act opened relief for time‑barred claims.
- The district court dismissed the petition because it did not present newly discovered evidence establishing factual innocence as required by the Act, and noted the petition only reasserted constitutional claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred in dismissing Parkhurst’s factual innocence petition | Parkhurst: The Factual Innocence Act creates a new avenue for relief and, read in pari materia with post‑conviction statutes, removes time bars for his constitutional claims | State: The Act is limited to petitions alleging factual innocence supported by newly discovered evidence; it does not subsume ordinary post‑conviction constitutional claims | Affirmed — dismissal proper because petition failed the Act’s statutory requirements (no newly discovered evidence of factual innocence) |
| Whether the Act should be read in pari materia with post‑conviction statutes to revive time‑barred claims | Parkhurst: Legislature enacted the Act and amended post‑conviction statutes in same bill; omission of a limitations period indicates intent to allow revived claims | State: Statutory construction shows the Act addresses a distinct subject (newly discovered evidence/factual innocence) and its plain language controls | Held against Parkhurst — statutes do not relate so as to read them together; Act’s plain scope governs |
| Whether Parkhurst adequately alleged "newly discovered evidence" demonstrating factual innocence | Parkhurst: Alleged ineffective assistance, conflict, and missing transcripts; implied these issues support innocence | State: Allegations are constitutional or procedural, not newly discovered evidence proving actual innocence | Court: Petition contained no supporting affidavits/documents showing newly discovered evidence establishing factual innocence; dismissal appropriate |
| Whether Parkhurst’s prior admissions/manslaughter statements are consistent with a claim of factual innocence | Parkhurst: Sought to recharacterize conduct as non‑criminal or excused (fear/terror) | State: Record includes admissions and statements inconsistent with statutory definition of factual innocence (which excludes lesser‑included offenses) | Court: Given admissions and manslaughter exposure, Parkhurst cannot credibly assert statutory "factual innocence" |
Key Cases Cited
- Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 1981) (background and appellate affirmance of convictions)
- Parkhurst v. Shillinger, 128 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) (prior federal habeas proceedings)
- Dougherty v. State, 237 P.3d 403 (Wyo. 2010) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Harris v. State, 137 P.3d 124 (Wyo. 2006) (plain statutory language and legislative intent govern construction)
- Sanders v. State, 7 P.3d 891 (Wyo. 2000) (manslaughter is lesser‑included offense of first degree murder)
- Gressman v. State, 323 P.3d 998 (Utah 2013) (de novo review of factual innocence petition adjudication)
- Miller v. State, 340 P.3d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (summary adjudication standard for factual innocence petitions)