627 F. App'x 921
Fed. Cir.2015Background
- ParkerVision seeks rehearing of our decision affirming non-infringement as a matter of law.
- Panel agreement: Dr. Prucnal’s admission that the baseband is created at the mixer output before storage capacitors defeats ParkerVision’s infringement theory.
- ParkerVision argues the mixer output is a modulated baseband carried on a carrier, with true baseband generated only when switches are opened and capacitors discharge.
- The panel rejected ParkerVision’s modulated-baseband theory, noting Prucnal identified the mixer output as baseband and that the carrier is eliminated at the mixer output.
- ParkerVision asserts the device would be inoperable if capacitors must generate the baseband; the court finds no evidence that every sampling mixer requires capacitors to generate baseband.
- The court also addresses storage-capacitor location, credibility determinations, and the sufficiency of substantial evidence for the verdict.
- The panel denies ParkerVision’s petition for rehearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the mixer output baseband or modulated baseband? | ParkerVision says output is modulated baseband carried on carrier. | Qualcomm/Panel: mixer output is baseband with carrier eliminated; no modulated-baseband output. | Mixer output identified as baseband; no modulated-baseband theory supported. |
| Does sampling require capacitors to generate baseband? | ParkerVision asserts sampling implies capacitor-based baseband generation. | Waived claim; standard definitions of sampling and generating applied; no universal capacitor requirement. | No support for broad claim that all sampling mixers require capacitors to generate baseband. |
| Do the capacitors’ locations affect baseband generation? | If capacitors are inside the mixer, they generate the baseband. | Dr. Prucnal testified baseband exists before capacitors; capacitor location does not change this. | Baseband exists before capacitors; capacitor location does not alter result. |
| Did ParkerVision’s expert testimony create a verdict-insufficient basis due to self-contradiction? | Jury could accept conflicting expert theories. | Court must apply substantial-evidence standard and not rewrite credibility determinations. | Verdict not supported by substantial evidence; district court correct to grant JMOL. |
Key Cases Cited
- Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (waiver when new claim construction raised after trial)
- Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946) (a verdict must be supported by substantial evidence)
- Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 543 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (self-contradictory testimony may undercut sufficiency of evidence)
- Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finder of fact may disbelieve witness testimony within reason)
- Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (one cannot create genuine issue of fact by contradicting sworn statements)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (substantial evidence standard for verdicts)