Parker v. Strawser Constr., Inc.
307 F. Supp. 3d 744
S.D. Ohio2018Background
- Tracy Parker, a transgender woman, worked for Strawser Construction from 2009 until her termination in October 2014 after disclosing a gender transition and reporting harassment and assault by co-workers.
- After disclosing gender dysphoria in 2012, Parker alleges repeated harassment, misgendering, derogatory comments, increased write-ups by her supervisor, and a co-worker’s sexual assault; employer responses were limited or ineffective.
- Parker’s therapist requested workplace accommodations (use of female restrooms, female pronouns) and Parker inquired about medical benefits for transition-related care; HR declined to research coverage and conditioned accommodations on unspecified ‘‘legal’’ documentation.
- Following complaints, Parker was demoted (replaced by an alleged harasser), suspended for sending texts complaining of unfair treatment, required to see a company-approved therapist, and ultimately terminated for alleged insubordination when refusing an order that would have violated DOT hours rules.
- Parker filed an EEOC charge; the EEOC found sex-based harassment but not demotion/retaliation and made no finding on disability. She sued under Title VII, the ADA, and Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112 against Strawser and four individual managers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether individual managers are liable under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112 as "employers" | Individual defendants are "persons acting in interest of an employer" and thus individually liable under Genaro | Chapter 4112 does not authorize individual liability; Hauser undercuts Genaro | Individual liability under §4112.02(A) for supervisors/managers dismissed; Genaro no longer controlling |
| Whether Parker's gender dysphoria qualifies as a "disability" under the ADA and Chapter 4112 | Gender dysphoria is disabling and may stem from physical impairments; thus ADA/Ohio protections apply | Statutory exclusions bar ‘‘gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments’’; Parker didn’t plead a physical-impairment basis | Disability claims under ADA and Chapter 4112 dismissed for failure to allege gender dysphoria resulting from a physical impairment |
| Whether transgender/transitioning status is a protected class under Title VII and Chapter 4112 | Transgender status is discrimination on basis of sex and protected (failure-to-conform and status-based theories) | Transgender status is not a separate protected class under Title VII | Transgender/transitioning status is protected as sex discrimination; Parker pleaded membership in protected class |
| Whether Parker stated viable claims for sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation | Alleged disparate discipline, demotion in favor of harasser, termination pretext, pervasive harassment, and adverse actions after complaints | Employer contends harassment not severe/pervasive, lack of supervisor-caused tangible employment action, and insufficient causation for retaliation | Court denied Strawser’s motion in part: Parker plausibly pleaded sex discrimination, hostile work environment (employer negligence), and retaliation; claims survive at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state a claim plausible on its face)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (complaints cannot rest on conclusory allegations)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for disparate-treatment claims)
- Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (hostile work environment as sex discrimination)
- Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (severity/pervasiveness standard for hostile work environment)
- Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (definition of "supervisor" for employer vicarious liability)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (McDonnell Douglas prima facie not required at pleading stage)
- Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. sex-stereotyping and transgender protections)
- Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293 (Ohio Supreme Court recognizing possible individual liability under Chapter 4112)
- Hauser v. Dayton Police Dep’t, 140 Ohio St.3d 268 (clarified/skeptical treatment of Genaro; interpretations of individual liability under Chapter 4112)
- E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. holding discrimination against transgender persons is discrimination because of sex)