Parker v. State, 2014 Ark. 542

In 2003 Ronald E. Parker pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault and was sentenced as a habitual offender to 204 months’ imprisonment.
In 2014 Parker filed three pro se motions in the trial court seeking (1) that a "prison bond" be set and a pardon granted (June 10), (2) bond and pardon (July 16), and (3) that the court press charges against two people who allegedly made false accusations (July 16).
The trial court denied the June 10 motion on June 20, 2014, and denied the July 16 motions in separate orders entered July 16, 2014.
Parker filed a notice of appeal (stating appeal from a July 7, 2014 order) and later moved this Court to appoint counsel for the appeal.
The Supreme Court found that all three trial-court motions were collateral attacks on the 2003 judgment and thus governed by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1/37.2; they were filed well beyond the 90-day time limit for postconviction petitions following a guilty plea, so the trial court (and thus the appellate court) lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Parker's pro se filings were proper collateral attacks or timely postconviction petitions	Parker sought release, bond, pardon, and prosecution of others; argued insufficiency and other defects justify relief	State argued motions were collateral attacks governed by Rule 37 and untimely	Held: Motions were postconviction collateral attacks subject to Rule 37 and were untimely; trial court lacked jurisdiction
Whether the appellate court should appoint counsel for Parker's appeal	Parker requested appointed counsel for the appeal	State did not respond; court reviewed merit threshold	Held: Appeal dismissed as meritless/untimely; appointment motion rendered moot
Whether the trial court could grant a pardon or relief in postconviction proceedings	Parker requested a pardon as part of relief	State: Pardons/clemency are executive functions, not relief available in Rule 37 proceedings	Held: Pardons/clemency are exclusively executive; request is not a basis for Rule 37 relief
Whether Parker's request to have the trial court "press charges" against others could proceed in this forum	Parker sought criminal charges against third parties for alleged false accusations	State: Such request is collateral to the underlying judgment and cannot circumvent Rule 37 timing	Held: Request is a collateral attack tied to the judgment and subject to Rule 37 time bar; untimely and not actionable here

Coones v. State, 280 Ark. 321, 657 S.W.2d 553 (Ark. 1983) (pardon and executive clemency are within the exclusive province of the executive branch)
Smith v. State, 262 Ark. 239, 555 S.W.2d 569 (Ark. 1977) (same principle regarding executive clemency)

Appeal dismissed; motion for appointment of counsel moot.