Parker v. John Moriarty & Associates
221 F. Supp. 3d 1
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Movant Deborah Khalil-Ambrozou (plaintiff Parker’s mother, proceeding pro se) sought to intervene in Parker’s pending personal-injury action against John Moriarty & Associates, arguing her own injuries arose from an altercation at her home and a court-ordered evaluation in 2016.
- The court previously denied Movant’s Motion to Intervene (Rule 24) and Motion to Retain Right of Party to Intervene, concluding she lacked Article III and prudential standing and did not present claims sharing common questions with Parker’s suit.
- Movant filed a motion construed as a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration asking the court to reverse its denial of intervention.
- The court reviewed the standards for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) (intervening change in law, new evidence, or clear error) and considered whether intervention as of right (Rule 24(a)) or permissive intervention (Rule 24(b)) was warranted.
- The court found Movant offered no new grounds, evidence, or change in law and that permissive intervention would not be appropriate because her claims did not share common questions and would cause undue delay.
- The court denied the Rule 54(b) reconsideration motion and incorporated its prior Memorandum Opinion into the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court should reconsider its denial of Khalil-Ambrozou’s motion to intervene | Khalil-Ambrozou argued the court erred and asked the court to reverse its denial | Court previously denied intervention for lack of standing and lack of common questions; no new basis to reconsider | Denied — no new evidence, change in law, or clear error shown |
| Whether Khalil-Ambrozou may intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) | She asserted an injury related to the case that warrants intervention as of right | Parker’s suit arises from a workplace injury in 2014; Movant’s asserted injury is distinct and she lacks Article III and prudential standing | Denied — Movant lacks Article III and prudential standing for intervention as of right |
| Whether permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is appropriate | Movant contended permissive intervention should be allowed | Defendant and court noted Movant’s claims do not share common legal or factual questions and intervention would delay the case | Denied — no common question and would cause undue delay |
| Whether oral argument is needed on the reconsideration motion | Movant implicitly sought further consideration | Court exercised discretion on procedure | Denied — court found oral argument unnecessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Flythe v. D.C., 4 F. Supp. 3d 216 (D.D.C. 2014) (district court has broad discretion to hear Rule 54(b) motions)
- Isse v. Am. Univ., 544 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2008) (standards for reconsideration and Rule 54(b) discretion)
- Lyles v. District of Columbia, 65 F. Supp. 3d 181 (D.D.C. 2014) (reconsideration appropriate “as justice requires”)
- Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing reconsideration standard under Rule 54(b))
- Stewart v. Panetta, 826 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2011) (movant must show change in law, new evidence, or clear error to obtain reconsideration)
- Zeigler v. Potter, 555 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2008) (same reconsideration framework)
- Toolasprashad v. Bur. of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (courts must construe pro se filings liberally)