2018 Ohio 320
Oh. Ct. App. 2nd Dist. Champai...2018Background
- On Sept. 8, 2013 Parker asked a McAuliffe's ACE employee where kerosene was; a female clerk (Reigle) allegedly pointed him to and identified Coleman Camp Fuel as kerosene; Parker bought the cans, ignited a brush pile, vapors exploded, and he suffered severe burns.
- Parker sued ACE, McAuliffe's entities, Coleman, and others asserting negligence, negligent misrepresentation, failure-to-warn, and express/implied warranty claims; claims against Coleman and one individual were later dismissed/refiled regionally.
- ACE moved for summary judgment arguing (1) the product label expressly warned it was not kerosene and not to be used as a fire starter, (2) Parker failed to read the label, (3) any reliance on the clerk was unreasonable, (4) many common-law claims are preempted by the Ohio Products Liability Act (OPLA), and (5) warranty claims failed for lack of pre-suit notice or were UCC claims not pled.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for ACE, finding (a) the cans were plainly labeled Coleman Camp Fuel with warnings, (b) Parker admitted he did not read the label and would have acted differently if he had, (c) negligent-misrepresentation and failure-to-warn theories failed because true facts were available on the cans, and (d) warranty claims did not establish an implied reliance necessary under UCC § 2-315.
- The appellate majority affirmed, holding Parker’s negligence, negligent-misrepresentation, failure-to-warn, and warranty claims were product-liability/common-law claims abrogated or controlled by the OPLA (R.C. 2307.71 et seq.), and that Parker did not plead UCC warranty claims adequately.
- Judge Tucker concurred in part and dissented in part: he agreed summary judgment on warranty claims could stand, but would have held Parker’s negligence claim (grounded in the clerk’s allegedly mistaken identification) was not an OPLA products-liability claim and survived summary judgment under the Restatement §323/Good Samaritan duty analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Parker’s negligence, negligent-misrepresentation, and failure-to-warn claims are preempted/abrogated by the OPLA | Parker contends his negligence and misrepresentation claims are distinct common-law duties (duty to locate product, advise fitness, accurately identify product) and not preempted | ACE argues these are product-liability claims (warnings/representations about a product) and thus governed exclusively by the OPLA | Majority: Claims are product-liability/common-law product claims subject to OPLA and summary judgment for ACE affirmed |
| Whether ACE can obtain summary judgment on negligent misrepresentation/failure-to-warn given the product labeling and Parker’s admission he did not read warnings | Parker argues he relied on clerk’s statements and did not know the product was camp fuel; reliance excused | ACE points to clear, unambiguous label warnings on cans that contradicted the clerk’s alleged statement and shows Parker would have acted differently had he read them | Court: Reliance was unreasonable because the cans were plainly labeled and Parker admitted he would have read/acted differently; misrepresentation and failure-to-warn claims fail |
| Whether implied warranty (fitness for particular purpose) claim survives | Parker claims the clerk’s guidance created an implied warranty that the product was suitable to start a brush pile fire | ACE argues Parker simply asked where kerosene was; he did not seek the clerk’s skill to select a product for that specific purpose, so UCC §2-315 claim fails; also warranty claims were not pled under UCC and lack pre-suit notice | Court: Warranty theory can only be implicit UCC §2-315; Parker did not plead the UCC sections or pre-suit notice; summary judgment for ACE affirmed |
| Whether a Good Samaritan/assumed-duty theory (Restatement §323) could create a duty independent of OPLA | Parker (per concurrence) urges that once the clerk undertook to assist, she assumed a duty of reasonable care and Parker reasonably relied on her selection | ACE maintains its obligation was limited to affixing manufacturer warnings and that primary assumption of risk and Parker’s failure to read the label bar recovery | Concurrence: Judge Tucker would have held a jury question exists under §323(b) (assumed duty/reliance); Majority rejected this, finding OPLA controls and summary judgment proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 (Ohio 2002) (articulates duty as a legal question and ties duty to foreseeability)
- Briere v. The Lathrop Co., 22 Ohio St.2d 166 (Ohio 1970) (adopts Restatement §323 duty-once-you-assist principle)
- Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1955) (Good Samaritan reliance principle where voluntary undertaking creates duty)
- Miller v. ALZA Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (analyzes whether warranty claims are UCC claims or common-law product claims abrogated by OPLA)
- Miles v. Raymond Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (discusses interplay of warranty claims and OPLA)
- Evans v. Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (explains OPLA abrogates common-law product liability causes of action)
- Horvath v. Ish, 134 Ohio St.3d 48 (Ohio 2012) (explains primary assumption of risk can negate duty in appropriate contexts)