Parker, McCray, and Fortson v. United States
17-CO-755+
| D.C. | Jul 22, 2021Background
- In 2012 a jury convicted Timothy Parker, Marcellus McCray, and Antonio Fortson of voluntary manslaughter while armed and related offenses; they appealed (McCray I).
- This court in McCray I rejected most claims but remanded for two discrete issues: (1) a Brady disclosure claim about a witness Shunedia Rajah’s 911 recording, and (2) whether government witness Curtis Faison suffered a mental disability that seriously diminished his credibility.
- On remand the Superior Court denied appellants an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim (finding no suppression or material prejudice) and held an experts’ hearing on Faison’s mental condition.
- Experts disagreed: the government’s expert (Dr. Patterson) found Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) but no active bipolar symptoms or credibility impairment; appellants’ expert (Dr. Gupta) saw depression/anxiety but the court found her opinions conclusory. The court credited Dr. Patterson and found no serious impairment of credibility.
- Appellants also sought to vacate their manslaughter convictions based on the “urban gun battle” causation instruction later held defective in Fleming; the court held that claim waived because McCray I was a case remand that terminated the direct appeal and appellants failed to show exceptional circumstances to resurrect the claim on appeal.
- The court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings: denied a Brady hearing, upheld the finding that Faison’s mental condition did not seriously impair credibility, and declined to consider the Fleming instructional challenge (direct appellants must pursue collateral relief under D.C. Code § 23‑110).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the urban‑gun‑battle causation instruction (later invalidated in Fleming) requires vacation of manslaughter convictions | Appellants: Fleming shows the causation instruction misstated law (used "substantial factor" rather than but‑for causation), so convictions invalid | Government: Appellants waived this claim by not raising it on direct appeal; McCray I was a case remand that terminated direct appeal; no exceptional circumstances to excuse waiver | Waived; court declines to reach Fleming claim here and directs appellants to raise it collaterally under § 23‑110 if they wish |
| Whether the government violated Brady by tardy or buried disclosure of Rajah’s 911 recording such that an evidentiary hearing was required | Appellants: recording was disclosed as part of a last‑minute ‘‘document dump’’ and was effectively hidden, depriving them of use at trial | Government: recording was produced 29 days before testimony, clearly labeled, so not suppressed or materially withheld | Trial court did not err denying a hearing; appellants failed to proffer facts showing suppression or that a hearing would be useful |
| Whether appellants were entitled to an expert evaluation of witness Faison because his mental history seriously impaired his credibility | Appellants: juvenile records showing bipolar diagnosis warranted expert testing to show serious credibility impairment | Government: experts showed no bipolar activity at trial; ASPD does not necessarily impair truth‑telling; no serious impact established | Trial court’s crediting of government expert and finding no serious impairment was not clearly erroneous; exclusion/limitation of psychiatric impeachment was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Fleming v. United States, 224 A.3d 213 (D.C. 2020) (en banc) (overruled Roy and held but‑for causation required for personal causation under urban gun‑battle theory)
- Roy v. United States, 871 A.3d 498 (D.C. 2005) (previously approved ‘‘substantial factor’’ causation instruction)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (Supreme Court discussion of but‑for causation in criminal causation context)
- McCray v. United States, 133 A.3d 205 (D.C. 2016) (McCray I) (initial appeal rejecting most claims and ordering a case remand to address Brady and witness‑mental‑disability issues)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s obligation to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
- United States v. Flores, 995 F.3d 214 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (intervening change in law can in exceptional circumstances excuse forfeiture on second appeal)