Park, Chan v. Elaine McKeon & Exxon Mobil Corporation, 429 S.W.3d 142

Park sued Exxon Mobil for negligence, claiming a duty to protect invitees from third-party crime; the trial court granted summary judgment finding no duty due to non-foreseeability.
The incident occurred July 15, 2009, when Park was shot at an Exxon station on Inwood Rd in Dallas while fueling; the shooter fled in a car taken from Park’s passenger side.
Park asserted Exxon knew or should have known of a pattern of area crime and failed to implement reasonable security measures (security patrols, fencing, late-night presence).
The court reviewed the traditional summary judgment standard de novo, and explained that foreseeability-based duty is a matter of law, applying the Timberwalk framework (proximity, publicity, recency, frequency, similarity).
Five violent crimes occurred at or near the station in the two years before Park’s shooting, with various robberies and an assault; no firearms-in-five-crimes or other pattern established a duty.
Court held that, as a matter of law, the crime was not foreseeable under Timberwalk factors and affirmed dismissal; extensive additional security-related evidence did not create a fact issue on foreseeability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Park’s shooting was foreseeable under Timberwalk factors	Park argues prior crimes near the station show foreseeability	Exxon contends prior crimes were not sufficiently proximate or similar	No; Exxon owed no duty as a matter of law
Whether proximity and publicity support a duty given prior crimes in the area	Evidence of nearby crimes and publicity should put Exxon on notice	Publicity and proximity do not prove foreseeability here	No duty based on proximity/publicity under Timberwalk
Whether other evidence (security policies, procedures, expert opinions) creates a fact issue on foreseeability	Policies and expert opinions suggest foreseeability	Such evidence does not establish foreseeability where Timberwalk factors fail	No fact issue; no duty established
Whether following security procedures would have foreseen the crime	Procedures show risk assessment should have occurred	Procedure existence does not prove foreseeability	No foreseeability; duty not created

Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008) (foreseeability framework; duty judged as a matter of law; multiple violent crimes insufficient to create protection duty)
Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998) (five-factor Timberwalk test for foreseeability: proximity, publicity, recency, frequency, similarity)
Mellon Mort. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999) (reasonableness of crime risk in nearby area; foreseeability tied to crime rate)
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard for traditional summary judgment; evidence viewed in non-movant’s favor)
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (burden on movant to show no genuine issue of material fact)
Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) (security measures alone do not prove foreseeability)
Boren v. Texoma Med. Ctr., Inc., 258 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (expert testimony cannot create a duty where law finds none)
Allright San Antonio Parking Inc. v. Kendrick, 981 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998) (expert opinion cannot override legal duty)