Paris Myers v. Commissioner Social Security
684 F. App'x 186
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Paris Myers (b. 1985) applied for Social Security disability insurance and SSI alleging mental impairments with an amended onset date of November 2009; ALJ denied benefits and District Court affirmed.
- Medical record: history of inpatient psychiatric treatment as a teen, special-education high-school diploma, later IQ testing (age 21: 78–89; age 27: 65–79), treatment notes showing improvement with medication, and inconsistent self-reports.
- Diagnosed with mild mental retardation / learning disorder, schizophrenia, and affective disorders; treated by psychiatrist Dr. Jiwesh Jha and seen by several consultative examiners and state reviewers.
- ALJ found Myers “not entirely credible,” assessed severe mental impairments at step two but concluded she did not meet/list equal any Listing at step three.
- ALJ gave Myers an RFC for unskilled, repetitive, low-stress work with no public interaction and limited supervisor/coworker contact and found she could perform her past laundry-work, concluding not disabled.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ misapplied Listing 12.05C (intellectual disability) by effectively requiring a qualifying IQ score from before age 22 | Myers: ALJ demanded pre-22 qualifying IQ score rather than allowing other evidence of onset before 22 | ALJ: considered IQ scores and longitudinal evidence and found insufficient proof of onset before 22; not requiring a pre-22 score but may weigh inconsistent scores | Court: ALJ did not err; may infer onset from longitudinal record; ALJ permissibly discounted inconsistent scores and evidence and concluded Listing 12.05C not met |
| Whether ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence | Myers: record and treating sources show greater limitations than RFC reflects | ALJ: RFC consistent with consultative examiners and state agency reviewers and with treatment records showing improvement | Court: Substantial evidence supports RFC; ALJ reasonably discounted portions of Myers’s testimony and credited other experts |
| Whether ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Penny Levin’s “marked” limitations | Myers: “Marked” is an administratively defined term and should be credited | ALJ: report lacked definition/context for “marked”; nonetheless RFC limited interactions accordingly | Court: ALJ permissibly evaluated Levin’s opinion and incorporated limitations into RFC where appropriate |
| Whether ALJ improperly rejected controlling weight for treating psychiatrist Dr. Jha’s opinion (Listing 12.04) | Myers: treating physician’s opinion should receive controlling weight showing Listing-level affective disorder | ALJ: Dr. Jha’s interrogatory conclusions were conclusory, unsupported by clinical/diagnostic detail and inconsistent with treatment notes and other experts | Court: ALJ permissibly declined controlling weight because opinion lacked explanation and conflicted with the record; rejection was supported by substantial evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607 (3d Cir.) (standard for substantial evidence review)
- Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546 (3d Cir.) (definition and application of substantial evidence)
- Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182 (3d Cir.) (onset before age 22 may be inferred from longitudinal evidence; pre-22 IQ testing not strictly required)
- Burnett v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112 (3d Cir.) (step-three listed-impairments purpose)
- Brownawell v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352 (3d Cir.) (weight of treating physician opinions)
- Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.) (ALJ may afford varying weight based on support/explanation)
- Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.) (ALJ may choose whom to credit when opinions conflict)