Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G
2020 COA 115
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Tammy Tatarcuk and Patrick Goldsworthy cohabited for over ten years and had a child.
- Goldsworthy petitioned for allocation of parental responsibilities; Tatarcuk sought dissolution claiming a common-law marriage; the matters were consolidated.
- A magistrate found there was no common-law marriage; Tatarcuk did not challenge that factual finding but moved to amend her petition to assert putative-spouse claims under § 14-2-111 (seeking maintenance and property division).
- The magistrate denied the putative-spouse amendment and awarded attorney fees and costs to Goldsworthy; the district court adopted the magistrate’s orders and also awarded fees for Tatarcuk’s petition for review.
- On appeal, the court addressed (1) whether putative-spouse status can be claimed after a court determines no common-law marriage existed, and (2) whether the fee awards were proper.
- The Court of Appeals held that putative-spouse status does not lie where no marriage ever existed (absence of marriage is not an ‘‘impediment’’ to a valid marriage) but reversed the attorneys’-fee awards because Tatarcuk advanced an arguably meritorious theory on an issue of first impression in Colorado.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a party obtain putative-spouse status under § 14-2-111 after a court determines no common-law marriage existed? | Tatarcuk: § 14-2-111’s plain language covers a person who cohabited and in good faith believed they were married, so she may plead putative-spouse status despite the magistrate’s finding. | Goldsworthy: Putative-spouse doctrine protects those whose marriages are invalid or prohibited (an impediment); it does not give a second bite where no marriage ever existed. | Held: No. Putative-spouse status protects those barred from a valid marriage by an impediment or whose marriage is invalid; unilateral belief without mutual consent (no marriage ever) does not qualify. |
| Were the magistrate’s and district court’s awards of attorney fees and costs under §§ 13-17-101 and -102 justified? | Tatarcuk: Her claim raised an arguably meritorious legal theory on an unsettled question in Colorado and was not frivolous. | Goldsworthy: The claim lacked substantial justification after the unchallenged finding that no marriage existed, so fee awards were proper. | Held: Reversed. Awarding fees was an abuse of discretion because Tatarcuk presented a good-faith, arguable theory on an issue of first impression. |
| Was the appeal of the magistrate’s fee order untimely? | Tatarcuk: N/A (argued jurisdiction was cured). | Goldsworthy: Tatarcuk’s petition for review was premature and thus untimely. | Held: The district court’s later review of the magistrate’s final fee order cured any jurisdictional defect; appeal is timely. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987) (common-law marriage requires mutual consent)
- Williams v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 670 P.2d 453 (Colo. App. 1983) (discusses purpose of putative-spouse protection)
- Combs v. Tibbitts, 148 P.3d 430 (Colo. App. 2006) (putative-spouse doctrine may apply where marriage is prohibited)
- W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1984) (definition of frivolous claim for fee awards)
- City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595 (Colo. 2005) (meritorious unsuccessful actions are not frivolous)
- McCormick v. Bradley, 870 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1993) (no fees when party presents arguably meritorious legal theory)
- Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2006) (timeliness; later final order can cure premature review)
- Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984) (unsuccessful appeal is not necessarily frivolous)