Pardo v. State
160 A.3d 1136
| Del. | 2017Background
- In Sept. 2014 Pardo struck bicyclist Phillip Bishop; Bishop died. Pardo drove ~0.3 miles home without stopping and reported the event the next morning. Pardo was later convicted (bench trial) of manslaughter, Leaving the Scene of a Collision Resulting in Death (LSCRD) under 21 Del. C. § 4202, reckless driving, and six counts of endangering the welfare of a child; he received a three-year sentence on the LSCRD conviction.
- The core legal question: whether Section 4202 is a strict‑liability felony (no mens rea required) and thus unconstitutional under due process when it carries a felony sentence with mandatory minimum incarceration.
- The Superior Court found Section 4202 constitutional and, alternatively, that Pardo knew he was in a collision and knowingly left the scene.
- This Court reviewed statutory construction and mens rea presumptions (11 Del. C. § 251), the statutory scheme in Chapter 42 (Sections 4201–4203), and comparative case law on hit‑and‑run scienter requirements.
- The Court held Section 4202 requires proof that the defendant knew he was involved in a collision (knowledge of the collision itself), but does not require knowledge that the collision resulted in injury or death; it rejected the notion that Section 4202 imposes strict liability.
- The Court also rejected Pardo’s additional claims (voluntary‑intoxication instruction, denial of judgment of acquittal, denial of missing‑evidence instruction), finding no reversible error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pardo) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §4202 is a strict‑liability offense such that due process is violated for a felony with mandatory minimum imprisonment | §4202 imposes criminal liability without requiring mens rea; a felony with mandatory minimum and collateral consequences fatally harms reputation and thus violates Morissette test | §4202 requires proof the driver knew a collision occurred; not strict liability | Court: §4202 is not strict liability; statute requires knowledge of having been involved in a collision but not knowledge of injury/death |
| If knowledge is required, whether the State must also prove knowledge of injury or death | Pardo: if knowledge required, must include knowledge of injury/death as element | State: only knowledge of involvement in collision is required; proving knowledge of injury/death would undermine statute’s purpose | Court: knowledge of collision suffices; actual or constructive knowledge of injury/death is not an element |
| Trial court’s use of voluntary intoxication language in manslaughter instruction | Objected that no evidence supported voluntary intoxication and that inclusion lowered State’s burden on recklessness | State: defendant testified to drinking 6–7 drinks; instruction accurately reflects §231(e) and was fact‑based | Court: no abuse of discretion; evidence supported consideration of voluntary intoxication and instruction was correct statement of law |
| Sufficiency of evidence / denial of judgment of acquittal and evidentiary objections (3507 statement, missing evidence) | Argues court ignored evidence, relied on improper hearsay, and should have received missing evidence instruction | State: evidence (damage to car, eyewitnesses, biological/material evidence, defendant’s actions) supports findings; foundational defects cured; reporter turned evidence over so no missing‑evidence instruction needed | Court: viewed evidence in State’s favor, found guilt supportable beyond reasonable doubt; no plain error or reversible evidentiary error; denial of missing‑evidence instruction proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (framework for when mens rea may be dispensed with and limits of public‑welfare/strict‑liability offenses)
- Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816 (Del. 2008) (construed motor‑vehicle death statute as evidencing legislative intent to impose strict liability for certain moving‑violation deaths)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (legislative silence on mens rea does not automatically mean intent element omitted; penalty weight factors into scienter analysis)
- Zhurbin v. State, 104 A.3d 108 (Del. 2014) (statutory‑construction principles and reading traffic‑safety statutes in context)
- People v. Holford, 403 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1965) (en banc) (Holford rule: liability where driver actually knew of injury or accident was such that a reasonable person would anticipate injury)