Papadakis v. Fitness 19 IL 116, LLC
148 N.E.3d 648
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- Maria Papadakis slipped and fell from an unsecured plyometric step while training at Fitness 19 under personal trainer Chad Drake and sued Drake and Fitness 19 (and affiliate) for negligence and willful-and-wanton conduct, plus respondeat superior against the employers.
- Trial court dismissed direct willful-and-wanton claims against Fitness 19 but left the willful-and-wanton claim against Drake intact; later granted summary judgment on all negligence claims based on a waiver-of-liability in the membership contract.
- The trial court’s summary judgment disposed of Counts 2 and 6 (respondeat superior) entirely; Papadakis argued those counts also alleged Drake’s willful-and-wanton conduct and thus should have survived summary judgment to that extent.
- Papadakis moved to reconsider and sought leave to file a third amended complaint to clarify that Counts 2 and 6 alleged willful-and-wanton conduct; the trial court denied both motions.
- The appellate court found it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of leave to amend (no Rule 304(a) finding) but had jurisdiction to review the denial of reconsideration of summary judgment and therefore reviewed whether Counts 2 and 6 sufficiently pleaded willful-and-wanton conduct.
- The court held the underlying facts pleaded in the common factual allegations (trainer moved worn, unsecured step to carpet, plaintiff expressed safety concerns, trainer insisted she continue and walked away) were sufficient to plead willful-and-wanton conduct and thus respondeat superior liability for that conduct should have survived summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate court has jurisdiction to review denial of leave to amend complaint | Denial is reviewable because summary judgment effectively disposed of related counts | No jurisdiction because order denying leave lacked Rule 304(a) finding and case was not final as other claims remained | No jurisdiction to review denial of leave to amend (order lacked Rule 304(a) language) |
| Whether summary judgment should have been entered as to respondeat superior Counts 2 and 6 | Counts 2 and 6, when read with incorporated factual allegations, pleaded Drake’s willful-and-wanton conduct and thus survived summary judgment as to that theory | Counts 2 and 6 were titled “Negligence—Respondeat Superior,” didn’t use words “willful and wanton,” and thus alleged only negligence | Reversed summary judgment insofar as it disposed of willful-and-wanton respondeat superior claims; Counts 2 and 6 sufficiently pleaded willful-and-wanton conduct and must proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352 (discusses employer vicarious liability under respondeat superior)
- Adames v. Sheahan, 233 Ill. 2d 276 (employer may be liable for employee’s negligent, willful, malicious, or criminal acts within scope of employment)
- Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898 (elements for respondeat superior: employment relationship, control, scope of employment)
- Jane Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479 (willful and wanton is an aggravated form of negligence; requires heightened state of mind)
- Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215 (willful and wanton conduct requires more than ordinary negligence)
- Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (willful and wanton may be only degrees more than negligence depending on facts)
- Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497 (describes willful and wanton as utter indifference to plaintiff’s welfare)
- Barr v. Cunningham, 2017 IL 120751 (willful and wanton can include failure to take precautions after knowledge of impending danger)
- Mashal v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341 (summary judgment standard; must be clear and free from doubt)
- HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145 (incorporation of general allegations into specific counts)