PANUSKI v. State
2012 Del. LEXIS 174
| Del. | 2012Background
- Panuski was indicted on 29 counts of Dealing in Child Pornography and pled guilty to two counts; other counts were nolle prosequi.
- Before sentencing, Panuski moved to merge/downgrade counts to Possession of Child Pornography; the court denied the motion and imposed an eight-year sentence on two DCP counts with reduction and probation.
- Panuski filed a postconviction motion on five grounds, two of which were previously deemed procedurally barred; remand ordered to address three remaining claims and expand the record with defense counsel affidavit.
- On remand, the Superior Court considered the three remaining claims (ineffective assistance, prosecutorial discretion, and colloquy) and denied relief on the merits.
- The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding none of Panuski’s claims merit; the motion for postconviction relief was properly denied.
- Procedural posture: prior Rule 61 rulings and remand proceedings frame the current review of postconviction relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process sufficiency of evidence | Panuski argues insufficient evidence to prove DCP because he pled to possession rather than intent. | State contends plea forecloses challenge; evidence shows intentional possession under DCP statute. | Barred; plea forecloses challenge; even if reviewed, evidence supports DCP under pleading. |
| Double jeopardy | Panuski claims conviction violates double jeopardy protections. | State argues prior adjudications bar relitigation; no new grounds shown warranting relief. | Barred as formerly adjudicated; no change in circumstances to justify reconsideration. |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel | Counsel failed to challenge indictment before plea and on appeal, and to address colloquy. | Counsel conducted a reasonable strategic defense; performance not deficient; no prejudice shown. | No Strickland violation; counsel's strategy and handling of sentencing were competent. |
| Prosecutorial discretion | State abused discretion by charging DCP rather than Possession counts. | Prosecutor has broad discretion; probable cause supported DCP charging under statute. | No abuse of discretion; probable cause existed and charging decision reasonable. |
| "Contradictive and ambiguous" colloquy at sentencing | Colloquy misled Panuski about whether he admitted possession or DCP. | Record shows Panuski admitted possession of two images; defense counsel explained statutory scope. | Record supports understanding of plea; colloquy not ambiguous or misleading; claim rejected. |
Key Cases Cited
- Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1975) (guilty plea does not bar review of all constitutional violations when logically inconsistent with guilt)
- Fink v. State, 2011 WL 1344607 (Del. 2011) (plea forecloses sufficiency challenge to charged count (WL citation))
- Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988) (prosecutorial discretion and sufficiency-related standards in Delaware)
- Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521 (Del. 2000) (procedural bars and claims in postconviction context)
- Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990) (standards for postconviction relief and procedural bars)
- Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362 (Del. 2011) (ineffective assistance and related standards in Delaware postconviction)