Pamela M. Perry, M.D. v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana
891 F.3d 954
11th Cir.2018Background
- Dr. Pamela Perry, an African‑American physician, sued multiple employers alleging discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; after multiple amendments the Fourth Amended Complaint contained eight counts against various defendants.
- The district court disposed of seven of the eight counts on the merits (dismissal, summary judgment, or judgment as a matter of law), leaving only a § 1981 discrimination claim against Naples HMA, LLC (NHMA).
- To avoid trying the lone § 1981 claim in isolation and to attempt immediate appellate review of the resolved claims, Perry and NHMA filed a joint stipulation purporting to dismiss only Count III (the § 1981 claim) without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
- The district court treated the stipulation as having left a claim pending and entered judgment dismissing the other claims with prejudice; later it ruled it lacked jurisdiction to enter final judgment under Rule 54(b) because the voluntary dismissal purportedly divested the court.
- The Eleventh Circuit held the joint stipulation invalid: Rule 41(a)(1)(A) permits voluntary dismissal only of an entire “action,” not a single claim, so the stipulation did not divest the district court of jurisdiction; the court reversed the district court’s jurisdictional ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) stipulation can voluntarily dismiss one claim while leaving others pending | Perry argued the parties could dismiss Count III by joint stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1)(A) to permit immediate appeal of other resolved claims | NHMA joined the stipulation asserting Rule 41 allows dismissal by stipulation and that the § 1981 claim could be dropped without court order | Held: Rule 41(a)(1)(A) authorizes voluntary dismissal only of an entire “action,” not a single claim; the stipulation was invalid |
| Whether the invalid stipulation divested the district court of jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 54(b) motion | Perry contended the stipulation had effect and left no jurisdiction, foreclosing final judgment entry | Defendants treated the stipulation as effective and argued court lacked jurisdiction to act | Held: Because the stipulation was invalid, the district court retained jurisdiction and erred in denying the Rule 54(b) motion on jurisdictional grounds |
| Appropriate procedural vehicle to remove a single claim without dismissing the action | Perry argued dismissal by stipulation was appropriate to eliminate the lone claim for strategic appeal reasons | Defendants relied on the text of Rule 41 for dismissal by stipulation | Held: The opinion explains Rule 15 (amendment) or Rule 54(b) (partial final judgment) are the proper vehicles to eliminate or secure review of resolved claims; Rule 41 does not serve that purpose |
| Whether the court needed to reach the “finality trap” issue (loss of appellate jurisdiction after voluntary dismissal) | Perry raised concerns about finality and appealability | Defendants argued finality consequences applied if stipulation effective | Held: Court did not decide the finality‑trap question because the stipulation was invalid and never divested the district court; issue left open |
Key Cases Cited
- Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 242 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2001) (Rule 41(a)(1) applies to dismissal of entire actions, not individual claims)
- Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a final, appealable decision)