217 So. 3d 163
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2017Background
- Plaintiff, a Vietnamese-origin IT employee with 10+ years of annual contracts, complained to her supervisor and the school board about hostile conduct and criticism of her accent.
- After her complaint, the school board did not respond and refused to renew her contract, telling her not to report to work.
- Plaintiff sued under the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) alleging discrimination (race and national origin), hostile work environment, harassment, retaliation, and a whistleblower claim.
- Trial court dismissed hostile-environment, harassment, and whistleblower counts; jury found for defendant on discrimination but for plaintiff on retaliation, and plaintiff was awarded $206,000.
- School board moved for new trial arguing the jury instruction on causation for the retaliation claim was incorrect; trial court denied the motion.
- The Fourth District, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded for a new trial on retaliation because the court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s but-for causation standard from Nassar and receded from its prior Guess precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What causation standard applies to FCRA retaliation claims? | FCRA follows prior Florida decisions (Carter, Guess) using a relaxed “not wholly or completely unrelated”/Olmsted-style standard. | Nassar changed Title VII retaliation law to require but-for causation; FCRA, being patterned after Title VII, must follow Nassar. | Adopted Nassar’s but-for causation for FCRA retaliation; receded from Guess and the “wholly unrelated” standard. |
| Was the jury instruction given at trial proper? | Plaintiff contended the court correctly applied Carter/Guess language and the parties had acquiesced. | Board argued the instruction should have followed Nassar (Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction 4.22). | Court held the instruction using Guess language was wrong under current federal law and required a new trial on retaliation. |
| Does federal Title VII precedent control interpretation of the FCRA? | Plaintiff urged reliance on existing Florida precedent interpreting FCRA. | Board argued Florida follows federal Title VII developments; changes in federal law require corresponding FCRA reinterpretation. | Court affirmed that FCRA is to be construed like Title VII; therefore federal changes (Nassar) govern FCRA retaliation claims. |
| Is Guess still binding precedent? | Plaintiff argued Guess remained controlling at time of trial. | Board argued Guess must be overruled in light of Nassar. | Court receded from Guess; Guess’s causation standard no longer valid post-Nassar. |
Key Cases Cited
- Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Guess v. City of Miramar, 889 So.2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (previous FCRA retaliation causation standard relying on Olmsted)
- Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457 (11th Cir. 1998) (adopted a relaxed “not completely unrelated” causation test)
- Carter v. Health Mgmt. Assoc., 989 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (applied Guess/Olmsted causation language to FCRA retaliation)
- State v. Jackson, 650 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1995) (state law patterned after federal law receives same construction)