407 F.Supp.3d 691
S.D. Tex.2019Background
- The Central American Minors (CAM) Parole Program (created 2014) allowed qualifying children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to enter the U.S. on refugee status or temporary parole; DHS ended the parole element in August 2017.
- Olman Palacios, A.P., and J.J.P. entered the U.S. on two-year parole on January 20, 2017; DHS notified them in August 2017 that the Program ended but their original parole would run until January 19, 2019 and they could apply for reparole via Form I-131.
- The sons filed reparole applications received by DHS on September 11, 2018; reparole was denied and they were given until September 15, 2019 to leave or obtain status (notice dated June 17, 2019).
- Plaintiffs (father Juan Palacios and the sons) sued DHS and moved for a TRO/preliminary injunction seeking extension of parole, work authorization, and injunction against enforcing the Program termination.
- The court found Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm from separation but denied injunctive relief because Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or that the court had jurisdiction to review reparole denials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DHS's termination of the CAM parole program was arbitrary and capricious under the APA | Termination was arbitrary, harmed reliance interests of applicants who had worked to obtain parole | DHS reasonably concluded the Program granted parole too broadly and explained its change to case‑by‑case parole to comply with statute and border security goals | Not likely to succeed; agency action was rationally connected to its findings and objectives |
| Whether denial of reparole is arbitrary and capricious and reviewable | Reparole denials lacked explanation and are arbitrary | Parole decisions are committed to agency discretion and generally unreviewable by courts | Not reviewable here; court lacks jurisdiction over discretionary parole denials |
| Whether terminating or rescinding parole approvals violated 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(f) | Rescission of parole approvals violated the regulation | The original parole periods were not rescinded; §212.5(f) applies when parole is authorized and does not compel reparole here | Claim not compelling; regulation inapplicable to denial of reparole |
| Whether Due Process or Equal Protection were violated by termination/denial | Family liberty interests and equal‑protection claims (racial/ethnic animus) support relief | No protected liberty interest in continued parole; immigration entry decisions are principally political and the termination had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons | Not likely to succeed; no protected interest shown and no convincing evidence of unconstitutional animus |
Key Cases Cited
- S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (analyzing CAM program termination and upholding agency rationale under APA)
- Jones v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 880 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 2018) (standard for temporary restraining order / preliminary injunction)
- Loa-Herrera v. Trominski, 231 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 2000) (congressional bar to judicial review of parole decisions)
- Worldcall Interconnect, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 907 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 2018) (APA arbitrary-and-capricious review requires rational connection between facts and agency decision)
- Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (immigration entry decisions receive circumscribed judicial review; no finding of unconstitutional animus)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (agency must consider reliance interests when changing policy)
- United States v. Nixon / Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (courts must defer to agency factfinding and not substitute their judgment)