Paige International, Inc. v. Xl Speciality Insurance Company, 267 F. Supp. 3d 205

HQ Hotel contracted with Hensel Phelps as prime contractor to build the Marriott Marquis; Hensel Phelps subcontracted work to Truland, which sub‑subcontracted telecommunications/security work to Paige.
Hensel Phelps required Truland to obtain a private Payment Bond from XL (with related sureties) guaranteeing payment to laborers/suppliers if Truland failed to pay.
Truland went bankrupt; Paige incurred storm‑remediation, acceleration, and pending change‑order costs and filed a claim under the Payment Bond and sued XL for unpaid sums.
After a six‑day bench trial, the Court found XL liable under the Bond but reduced some claimed damages (including a 50% reduction for insufficient proof) and credited payments XL had already made, awarding Paige $463,092.50.
Paige moved to amend the damages calculation, requested prejudgment interest, and sought attorney fees; the Court heard post‑trial briefing and issued the memorandum opinion resolving those motions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Court should amend its damages calculation (reduce 50% discount; reverse credit for SPL settlement)	The 50% reduction was improperly applied to storm and pending PCO claims; SPL credit was improper	The trial court properly exercised fact‑finding discretion given Paige’s deficient records; SPL credit was correct	Denied—Court affirmed its factual discount and credit decisions as reasonable exercise of its fact‑finding role
Whether Paige is entitled to prejudgment interest on the damages award	Prejudgment interest should be awarded to compensate deprivation of use of funds withheld since claim accrued	XL argued uncertainty of the amount owed (due to Paige’s poor recordkeeping) counsels against interest	Granted in part—Court awarded simple prejudgment interest at 6% (D.C. statutory rate), totaling $83,813.40, for a combined award of $546,905.90
Whether Paige may recover attorney fees from XL under the Payment Bond	The Bond should be read coextensive with Truland’s obligations to Paige (which include a fee‑shifting clause), so fees are recoverable	The Bond is a private common‑law instrument that limits recovery to "amounts due for labor, material or equipment" and contains no fee provision	Denied—Court held the Bond’s text does not cover attorney fees and declined to import the Sub‑subcontract’s fee clause into the Bond

West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (establishes distinction between pre‑ and post‑judgment interest)
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (post‑judgment interest runs from entry of judgment)
House of Wines, Inc. v. Sumter, 510 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1986) (D.C. Code § 15‑109 affords courts broad discretion to award prejudgment interest)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (fee applicant bears burden to establish entitlement to attorney fees)
United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (Miller Act bonds construed liberally to protect laborers and suppliers)
Purcell v. Thomas, 28 A.3d 1138 (D.C. 2011) (contract language controls; cannot imply liability beyond contract terms)
Goldberg, Marchesano, Kohlman, Inc. v. Old Republic Sur. Co., 727 A.2d 858 (D.C. 1999) (scope of surety liability measured by bond terms)
Estate of Dickson v. [unknown], 736 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 1999) (surety liability not to be extended by implication)
Tri‑State Employment Services, Inc. v. Mountbatten Surety Co., 295 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002) (surety bond construed with principal contract; liability coextensive with principal‑obligee obligations)