Pahoua Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc.
658 F. App'x 884
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- In May 2009 Pahoua Xiong’s car collided with a Knight truck on I-76; jury apportioned fault 40% to Xiong and 60% to Knight.
- Xiong sustained a T-11 compression fracture, was hospitalized five days, sought pain meds, declined physical therapy, and later alleged continuing pain and recommended spinal surgery she had not had for financial reasons.
- Xiong claimed $95,108.67 in past medical expenses; a billing estimate placed the recommended surgery at $173,673.10.
- Jury awarded $832,000 (pain & suffering $282,000; economic loss $268,000; physical impairment $282,000), reduced by 40% to $499,200.
- After trial Knight found social-media photos and later obtained surveillance; it moved for a new trial (insufficient evidence and newly discovered evidence/fraud). District court denied the motion.
- Knight sought to introduce details of Xiong’s separate 2010 accident lawsuit; the court limited evidence to notice that another accident and suit existed. Xiong sought statutory costs under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-202 based on an email stating counsel had authority to demand $675,000; the court denied costs as the email was too ambiguous to be a statutory settlement offer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for large pain, suffering, and impairment awards | Xiong: jury heard her testimony and medical testimony supporting pain, impairment, and future care | Knight: evidence showed minimal objective signs, inconsistencies, and potential exaggeration; award was excessive | Affirmed — verdict not so excessive as to shock the conscience; credibility and conflicting evidence for jury/district court to resolve. |
| Future medical expenses (necessity of recommended surgery) | Xiong: surgery was recommended and she cannot afford it; jury may award future medical costs | Knight: surgery not undergone, conservative care appropriate, so future surgery costs not recoverable | Affirmed — question for jury; failure to have surgery explained by financial inability and conflicting expert opinions. |
| Newly discovered post-trial photos/surveillance (new-trial motion) | Xiong: photos/surveillance do not undermine verdict; evidence ambiguous and could have been found earlier | Knight: photos and surveillance show inconsistency with claimed limitations and merit new trial | Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion; evidence was discoverable earlier, largely impeaching/ambiguous. |
| Whether counsel’s email constituted an "offer of settlement" under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-202 | Xiong: email stating counsel had authority to demand $675,000 should qualify as an offer for costs | Knight: email ambiguous and did not constitute a firm offer | Affirmed denial of costs — email too ambiguous (passive voice, no request for acceptance) to qualify as statutory offer. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir.) (standard for reviewing excessive damages and deference to jury on pain-and-suffering awards)
- M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753 (10th Cir.) (verdict shocks-conscience standard)
- Prager v. Campbell Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir.) (deference to district court on remittitur when verdict turns on witness credibility)
- Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d 658 (10th Cir.) (elements for new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
- Richison v. Ernest Grp., 634 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir.) (forfeiture of appellate arguments not raised below)
- Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965 (10th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049 (10th Cir.) (bounds of permissible choice in discretion review)
- Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.) (applicability of state cost-shifting statute in federal diversity cases)
- Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo.) (mandatory nature of costs under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-202)
- Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942 (Colo.) (statutory interpretation of offer under Colorado law)
